Malicious Office (OLE) / .PPT — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 eb19448363f172bb…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .PPT

185.0 KB Created: 2020-12-09 16:16:34 Authoring application: Microsoft Office PowerPoint
MD5: d0e238059ab977771b084cecf748c238 SHA-1: 9fc65c4deeda39a5548003a9868057afb3972df2 SHA-256: eb19448363f172bb9d26b7db62c304073f55ff5b1b886dccba985f52be25ddb9
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is a PowerPoint file containing VBA macros. The Auto_Close macro is configured to execute a command using the Shell() function. This indicates the file is designed to run arbitrary commands upon opening or closing. No specific malware family could be identified, but the technique suggests a downloader or initial execution stage.

Heuristics 5

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Auto_Close macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOCLOSE
    Auto_Close macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://1230948%1230948@j.mp/gaskhdgajksdghavband

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
29e36da9285c13666d701c37ba4dd8b849311fd1002f1b4a41a7d6a806adb593
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 48888 bytes