Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 eb0786d23a2ada26…

MALICIOUS

RTF

78.6 KB First seen: 2024-09-22
MD5: d63c7600ca42fe65af91ae662ef7b637 SHA-1: 6f8bba7b9751ed550d0bd7f6f29e7229888ad6f9 SHA-256: eb0786d23a2ada26a937a41d56a96514a3df0027ff857d0407d462adfba18ddb
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The presence of \objupdate indicates that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically upon opening the document, leading to code execution. This is a common delivery mechanism for malware, often used to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001518.bin
2c0a0b8ef5b537b0e6ee4c8bce9b99a2126a519e255abb0eba8ac145ff4b21ca
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1518 1389 bytes