Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 eadab7cfc026a3c9…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

53.4 KB
MD5: a7f29e6a97b3f6badd27d5037f5f182b SHA-1: b8f9f3150568ce59200f583625015fa76028cf71 SHA-256: eadab7cfc026a3c9ae71837b247262b76824f3c82643635184850426b12fc96b
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document that contains embedded OLE object data. Heuristics indicate the use of the Equation Editor vulnerability (RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR) and that the object is set to update automatically (RTF_OBJUPDATE), suggesting it's designed to exploit a vulnerability upon opening. This pattern is commonly used to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000a0c.bin
db4848b1e66281639259b6328038949c157bd35567b7c550320b06f990567605
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xA0C 1917 bytes