PDF malware analysis — malicious · ead5e9111e1f375a

MALICIOUS

PDF

17.7 KB Created: 2010-08-29 16:19:36 Authoring application: styeZek colSnap

MD5: 3bfa44571d163e5cce90359642c5117f SHA-1: d66df476310c4376e4ea86e7e9a68d1ea1905343 SHA-256: ead5e9111e1f375a7e44b4f452cccd3109a496e221e31887592ef2914864266e

136 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The PDF file contains embedded XFA forms with executable scripts, a known technique for exploiting PDF vulnerabilities. The critical heuristic 'PDF_XFA_SCRIPT' and ClamAV detection 'Pdf.Exploit.Dropped-81' strongly indicate malicious intent. The embedded script likely downloads and executes a second-stage payload, although its exact function is obscured by obfuscation.

Heuristics 5

XFA form contains risky executable script high CVE related PDF_XFA_SCRIPT

PDF embeds an XFA form whose script block contains exploit, submission/launch, or shell-execution primitives. Ordinary LiveCycle print/update scripts are left as generic XFA/JS signals unless stronger behavior is present.
ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Dropped-81 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Dropped-81
Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD

PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED

PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
XFA form low PDF_XFA

PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic

Extracted artifacts 7

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`embedded_file_obj0008.bin` `d81baa73e490e4cb879e13927cacd1dd1be37524a37eac51603e15117c578777`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0x213	84 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0009.bin` `24c130f03a4cf51d470b536e94c1e58af67665739e200e0ce198ad41086243c0`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 9 at offset 0x2C4	228 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0010.bin` `68a18f6de532af4051a831d9d1c03bce60cb837d5aad034ccc74e911a67d71ee`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 10 at offset 0x3B7	1373 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0011.bin` `c97e0522381d6196cc0695f35f4d065f15c9c86a9601a7f776c6afd3f4c6b460`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 11 at offset 0x6E8	199 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0012.bin` `a2b8b2abeaee84f38cab764da150f426aa13c5cda280b77c96b9efdb39b9ab56`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 12 at offset 0x7DA	34065 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0013.bin` `e6c26a3478346d27e841ad49868ebf68bf4c6863b6750e8d60bda3c4c6f79876`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 13 at offset 0x423D	77 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0014.bin` `92a3ce61d783e15932b5de127ce45a9b4c2f98f4da2453f65241573c1dda808a`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 14 at offset 0x42E4	56 bytes

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