Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 eac8ea4187b55206…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

19.0 KB Created: 1998-01-09 14:21:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Word 6.0 First seen: 2012-06-14
MD5: ebaab2c2800263e588f294195324da3b SHA-1: fbab1928d8eb4b78ae2a55ba1d7eebe913ad0aca SHA-256: eac8ea4187b55206f5f45fbf588e61abe442f6fa4ffa67014758c02cfacc5389
280 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic

The file exhibits characteristics of a legacy WordBasic macro virus, indicated by specific markers and the presence of embedded OLE objects with suspicious static findings. The document body contains references to 'INNOCENCE 2' and macro-related commands like 'ToolsMacro' and 'FileSave', further supporting the presence of malicious macros. ClamAV detections for 'Win.Trojan.Innocence-2' and 'Win.Trojan.Schumann-1' on an extracted artifact confirm its malicious nature.

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Innocence-2 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Trojan.Innocence-2
  • Embedded Office document has suspicious static findings critical EMBEDDED_OFFICE_CHILD_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A CFB/OLE Office document was found inside another file type and its carved contents matched Office exploit or payload heuristics. This catches wrapped exploit documents where the top-level file routes to a PE, archive, or generic scanner instead of Office.
  • Legacy WordBasic macro-virus markers high OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_MACRO_VIRUS
    OLE Word document contains legacy WordBasic auto-execution macro markers such as AutoOpen plus ToolsMacro/MacroFile/fileMacro/globMacro or named historical macro-virus strings. These old Word 6/95 macro forms are not exposed as a modern VBA project, so normal VBA source extraction can miss them.
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 17,280 bytes but its declared streams total only 0 bytes — 17,280 bytes (100%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • CFB header with no readable streams medium OLE_PARSE_EMPTY_STREAMS
    The file begins with a valid OLE2/CFB header but exposes no directory streams. A non-empty compound document with an unreadable directory is anomalous — it is seen with truncated/corrupt files and, more importantly, with content deliberately shifted off byte boundaries to defeat parsers while the host application still recovers the object.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_office_off00000880.ole embedded-office Embedded OLE/CFB Office body inside ole container at offset 0x880 17280 bytes
SHA-256: 8f9cf550e6be8482341b221770f7f8f77db6c7a3712222aebb9d216ddcc9b515
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Schumann-1
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely

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