Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 eabb28e5f38c29cc…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

270.4 KB
MD5: a9f5437c71bb5abbdc8865f7e6ace8d5 SHA-1: 571eb804e3788aa0511b0395a5bd53bdd5269efa SHA-256: eabb28e5f38c29cc07f9b327c86d98bc73ec2ad869bbe1c93e2d4e748aefa279
165 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering critical heuristics related to Equation Editor and automatic OLE activation. This strongly indicates the use of a known vulnerability within the Equation Editor component to achieve arbitrary code execution upon opening the document. No specific family could be identified, and no further IOCs were extracted.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001be7.bin
14eddba2ac63c88ba6fa710e0bbc9208e952cd9d3732cc3fa98e5bfd7fe49c3f
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1BE7 4150 bytes