Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 eaa2d55dd6746e26…

MALICIOUS

PDF

102.1 KB Created: 2021-06-25 12:41:43 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 19d06477430b1689f20aa696373c9b8a SHA-1: 02081e93ecb16b1ca095b663833b80f74037f92d SHA-256: eaa2d55dd6746e2656561085dc4bfa652d3ba405425e7b22698549723a7a7355
156 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains numerous links pointing to compromised WordPress upload directories and other disposable hosting, indicating it functions as a link farm. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent, likely phishing or malware distribution through these links. No scripts were extracted, but the structure and URL analysis are sufficient to determine the attack pattern.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9990

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.jcca.co.in/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607668758a20f---telorimiputomotiwa.pdf
    • https://frontlinetherapist.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/dca98d2c158119707ec0ff5e4a60464c/74552214851.pdf
    • https://hopefor.today/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/323e5d9bbcf3561bbdc02b74179ea96f/43508592979.pdf
    • https://cruiseship.cruises/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/rv5m9928fercjd6tq9jtmsbsn8/toxedezipuwatix.pdf
    • https://www.swx.global/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/6ab42359108d66bd9be4268c6c128416/99288698549.pdf
    • http://www.aluvascientific.com/UserFiles/file/36736007127.pdf
    • http://cheers-gifts.com/userfiles/xolexasirekalok.pdf
    • http://turagent007.ru/userfiles/file/5737879142.pdf
    • http://nek.ua/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a4be2f701de---4601762360.pdf
    • http://www.iycadana.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/do1af69ob4e46qvg195s75q865/19867321139.pdf
    • https://xn-----6kcabagcgfjsxjciriy6alkh6a7aqk.xn--p1ai/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/9cff48e7392d80ecc5b1d4ba05a3de49/42004770594.pdf
    • https://broadcasthub.com/ci/userfiles/files/80161957878.pdf
    • http://dzwigipoznan.pl/userfiles/file/sapewak.pdf
    • http://www.drop-lok.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b804eac95f1---sovebive.pdf
    • http://www.1000ena.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160d4579a07ee7---11589226693.pdf
    • https://churchosonline.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/80f9560417099652a485a1a62b704640/genetol.pdf
    • http://serendipityorlando.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160773efc06276---8560875411.pdf
    • http://vilaportugal.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608e9a6a0c61d---wisitofosezuwexerux.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/zMnd8XtcwSM/uplcv?utm_term=how+to+byheart+long+answers+quickly
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000129a9.bin
030ef66893b064359b371e3d620e11ecbe8a8057836ccb9eb7b4be187fd3a2b2
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x129A9 11176 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00014380.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x14380 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00015b92.bin
8143cd1a69265bd1553c17772f191956390c4e51265f6bb1ba1f64526ede8b57
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x15B92 17720 bytes