Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ea7ebfce1cd66482…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.9 KB Created: 2020-10-03 08:35:29 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-23
MD5: bc626da0615ecb005299d1a7f6080c74 SHA-1: bb289d6dbb15c41d1e185ce25d580c03ca56514b SHA-256: ea7ebfce1cd66482a2c736344af26b16c1c0830937fe04b961af3ea63f109d71
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application

The PDF file contains numerous embedded links, with several pointing to suspicious domains and identified as part of a link farm. One critical heuristic indicates a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The ML classifier also strongly flagged this PDF as malicious. The document body itself is heavily obfuscated and contains a mix of text and URLs, suggesting an attempt to disguise its malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/strik?keyword=diff%25C3%25A9rents+types+de+contes In PDF document text
    • http://razipog.reviveandrestore.net/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776582/paxifo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://firoguva.lcpcpc.net/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739625/juxukumof-biranoberubere.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.hprecsummercamp.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398547/mokarepejetadavuzu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://luluvet.robertruffjr.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776804/xuzasidikosa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1039658.mozfiles.com/files/1039658/47077478082.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037207.mozfiles.com/files/1037207/ledezasorakegenimak.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037202.mozfiles.com/files/1037202/dojarinil.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1039215.mozfiles.com/files/1039215/64162780781.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/5843a675-8c39-427e-9f82-26f7409259f8/171327664.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/aec1d35f-0e8a-432b-9556-dd5a18f379a5/xevutatiboxev.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/6cf5f9d4-34e6-4a7e-841d-16d501afe396/20993812171.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/e38b8601-7637-4375-8947-a6aabe174449/bogemedinixekat.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0483/3437/3027/files/accent_reduction_classes_nyc.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0482/9007/0690/files/watch_iron_man_1_netflix.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006e48.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6E48 5152 bytes
SHA-256: 192541d155dd1f573e173393ba23a2d59c0434142ec77395590c0eb4d24db01d
font_01_sfnt_off00007fb4.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7FB4 12044 bytes
SHA-256: 5de6b9c51dc24f82e65c913819077fbd56d6c90119bbe41aadb575182e029c70