Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ea7b95e7e4adff57…

MALICIOUS

PDF

8.1 KB
MD5: 8aa171e900bbd4e3bb09713a49102c09 SHA-1: 0c8c40e05fbb20ded50a51c85611704c00d32b00 SHA-256: ea7b95e7e4adff571de833b5bea2110fb711e75709698e1b19eee49d86f8911d
166 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF contains heavily obfuscated JavaScript, identified as a multi-stage dropper. This script is designed to evade analysis and download additional malicious content. The ClamAV detection 'Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36086' further confirms its malicious nature. The primary attack pattern involves leveraging embedded JavaScript to fetch and execute further stages of the attack.

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36086 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36086
  • unescape() call high PDF_UNESCAPE
    unescape() found — often used to decode shellcode in PDF JS exploits (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Obfuscated multi-stage PDF JavaScript dropper high PDF_JS_OBFUSCATED_DROPPER
    PDF JavaScript shows 3 independent signals of exploit-kit-style multi-stage obfuscation: annot_subject_stage, incremental_eval_build, repeated_pluginschk. This is strongly consistent with pre-2011 Adobe Reader PDF droppers — OpenAction JS reads encoded data from annotation subjects, decodes it through one or more hex / base-N loops, and invokes eval indirectly (method name built one character at a time). The actual CVE is hidden in the final decoded layer and is not visible via static analysis.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • syncAnnotScan annotation-staging primitive low PDF_FOXIT_SYNCANNOTSCAN
    PDF JavaScript calls syncAnnotScan() — a no-op annotation-enumeration primitive used by exploit-kit JavaScript to stage payload reads from annotation /Subject fields before eval(). Not a vulnerable sink itself; rarely seen in legitimate PDFs. (matched in decompressed stream)
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0006_000.js
f9b4659beaf681d266cfb5046d495e7b144d406eff72e71ecd4d1451ae25ca11
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 6 at offset 0x143 481 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js
a60251decd08a9b88f4e6201193a9a71e4306f781ccea7dee6f1bee402e72d55
deobfuscated-js repeated-marker hex decoded JavaScript at offset 0x1AC6 1936 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
deobfuscated.js
e7b85f0b67e6640e473109ce6cf60b9d659f5629835eec210800d73e0b9a853f
deobfuscated-js PDF JavaScript deobfuscation pass 25733 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 4 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 2 long base64-like blob(s).