Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ea7764c23c5983bd…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

339.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-08-02
MD5: 232013a865298f45776f7b142a21e473 SHA-1: 878805fa5ff7cf2c60e5adedd2bbf7ae146fe528 SHA-256: ea7764c23c5983bd93710d268876a9950f0a31a796cb2412f4c55475b2b38e83
132 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is an OLE file that exploits CVE-2017-0199, a known vulnerability for remote code execution. It contains an embedded URL pointing to a .DOC file, which is likely the secondary payload. The presence of a polyglot child PDF with suspicious static findings further indicates malicious intent. No VBA macros were found to be executable, but the primary exploit vector is clear.

Heuristics 5

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://172.245.142.47/okl/000000000000232000000000%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%232332000000000000%23%23%23%23%23%2334550000030000040000.DOC

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
stream_003_off00007560.bin
2998a126f4fa11ceb265371a5f7968ec18bc4692a32631a544232dc74040021f
decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x7560 252488 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00000e00.pdf
cfb454d124e7170c87d5c963d1a7aa458dd251b39c65ad4bfb8cebb57f235063
polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xE00 344064 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00007a00.pdf
837d7fa852919b550eb7966aef587aa160d7115657f2eff2f3b52e2cf899773d
polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x7A00 316416 bytes