RTF malware analysis — malicious · ea750ea56c5bafb0

MALICIOUS

RTF

8.6 KB First seen: 2020-02-04

MD5: ef370d7b11a51d0cccb36beac3c041c6 SHA-1: 0cb15f6cfbbf76dfc69e05385a410ce410179c9a SHA-256: ea750ea56c5bafb0feca294b12bdd5e7562898c18713c8309d38b08c36ea8936

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component. The \objupdate directive further suggests that the embedded object is intended to be activated automatically, leading to arbitrary code execution. No specific family could be identified, but the exploit pattern is common for initial compromise.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off000000a4.bin`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xA4	1796 bytes
SHA-256: `254b987075097ad4092bd2d52750fbf9d3214b624d9c65a69961e878e26d0727`

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