Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ea6dae02c5596988…

MALICIOUS

PDF

52.7 KB Created: 2020-10-12 03:41:26 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-10
MD5: 26486586b6b1c4a2f24a6d993bb7d083 SHA-1: e2abb5694dec88cc7284d003d340755c729fd8e2 SHA-256: ea6dae02c5596988806b69e4725f8f5371ceaadea4feed1fc9d9c258bdd672fb
184 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/pify?keyword=stock+item+name+list In PDF document text
    • http://files.leadtxip.org/uploads/1/3/2/6/132695874/dc35f0784.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.ggfloorfashions.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131384679/8310547.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pefipugit.iroquoismatildapastoralcharge.org/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813694/9ca9273.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zizovoj.jillwongphotography.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775484/gemibaruxeduxib.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pinipuguj.freedomsdoorssociety.ca/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164250/951407cf39.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036665.mozfiles.com/files/1036665/pelifagiza.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1038505.mozfiles.com/files/1038505/temakos.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1043562.mozfiles.com/files/1043562/33476198738.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1039295.mozfiles.com/files/1039295/6749021433.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0488/4447/2485/files/nekajijoveziv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0396/0731/files/sir_adrian_carton_de_wiart_facts.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0484/6537/9489/files/palumuzedikigekelodufiz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/8674e7e3-9143-4fa9-a8bc-ca27de34f5c6/32450091854.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/84b360fc-bf3a-4277-86b7-8b55d2df1e40/30016412665.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/00ac1762-85bc-430e-aaf4-77475c1873ba/33935161553.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/16d77b53-0d7e-4340-9d6d-2fe0188db30f/85490816945.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/af62f25e-5bc8-4ad7-b3d9-9f45cb3e0d04/pikukamolenivef.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00008396.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8396 4804 bytes
SHA-256: 18992c64ddeec04fe9e5a1227562470079def10d1704b234d90c62e5ffb78cbc
font_01_sfnt_off000093bb.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x93BB 10420 bytes
SHA-256: d39bb57789399ae18481149a1ffe806652a93622d7f7302a5f029d33300b59a3
font_02_sfnt_off0000b74c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB74C 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 0d0f64e27578eb124b8bc81c7eceacdd166e22eddd95c81328e9fbd7de2a6333

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.