Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ea4815e7334c8e76…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

26.7 KB
MD5: 4334999d60733dd8474547f99139257f SHA-1: 774665c1f4c170dc11e1dac182f86135df02317b SHA-256: ea4815e7334c8e7663cf1ae6551bdd5233544ea0403edee6c77f0a49d9e795fe
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample is an RTF document that contains embedded OLE objects, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability (RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR). The RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristic indicates that the OLE object is automatically activated upon opening, leading to exploitation. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the nature of the exploit suggests it is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload. The SHA256 hash is provided as a primary IOC.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001653.bin
6241e558b0d7d219be0d53dc2aa9aacd39cb2493a6ac7295be8cf92ee5b0079a
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1653 2107 bytes