Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ea25afed4fd9bfd0…

MALICIOUS

PDF

78.5 KB Created: 2021-05-25 07:45:09 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-25
MD5: 0edf91f6e6ee706f7c43c0182c52f9db SHA-1: 55653ad9ec410e7a822c3925ffe79818326b55bb SHA-256: ea25afed4fd9bfd04d7e14e65d80c22b87d0b649f70173a870664c77513669f2
214 Risk Score
Tags
free-cdn-ebook-manual-lure

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF document contains numerous external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting a link farm or phishing campaign. Heuristics indicate it's a lure for invoices or payments, and ClamAV detected it as a phishing trojan. The presence of embedded links and the nature of the heuristics strongly suggest this PDF is designed to redirect users to malicious websites for credential harvesting or malware distribution.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE
    Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://dugedepap.ru/strik?utm_term=colocar+dinheiro+no+picpay+com+cartao+de+credito PDF link annotation
    • https://xoxudepibedewem.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135317482/7568948.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tuwakunasuj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874309/64113c2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ralokokotozupar.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134340958/4770065.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xidusogosogi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134313600/7639003.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4459062/normal_6017368bc57a1.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zopixidasopotid.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131397955/bimezixop.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gumomamomav.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398069/pejezuzoxoxoz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4382407/normal_5ff7871fec835.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zenorawe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/3/132303237/a9b8b3.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mowazaxof.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134704653/sogevoses.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://webunufilijamo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134677486/c9f821350bfbea.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4452862/normal_5fda70ad1f565.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tirotirow.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380420/dozijato-fekibuv-kojosuzax-begad.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4404313/normal_60672ea084e41.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4454967/normal_6024b7f53436c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/4959a79f-3841-4d5f-8e2f-1fcf86be0cfa/what_did_steven_gundry_discover.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/25b8b61b-f3ee-4a0f-aa36-58df7c5c5528/kiwirabenowexediredotunep.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/vuforewebub/smart_greenhouse_project_report.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/tokit/alkuu_kitap.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/dugibabafod/causative_form_exercises_intermediate.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e2db.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE2DB 5144 bytes
SHA-256: c22f569edf0817ac497e6a71110682e508f30222b4fa5391f8ed70bb2bb0e576
font_01_sfnt_off0000f428.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF428 4640 bytes
SHA-256: af3a02c9432f2fcc5ce16397d37731e9580ca2beb6edc9a5d1d0f20e4730f58d
font_02_sfnt_off000100c9.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x100C9 13416 bytes
SHA-256: b2a9e8dc2bc883cdf450477656570cd776bd8d1700691adf36dd7d6003344b1b

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