Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ea030ccbba731ff6…

MALICIOUS

PDF

76.6 KB Created: 2021-03-24 16:35:30 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 0c4e036f3ae4c8960e9754347869ff38 SHA-1: 72efb222169d2c2e898fbf0c5c56d472053cd440 SHA-256: ea030ccbba731ff6744e947cc810db90094eb9cd8b79ffb7220ea25bf9d1da63
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document exhibits characteristics of a link farm, containing numerous external links pointing to various domains, many of which are hosted on disposable or suspicious platforms. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely for phishing or malware distribution. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and extensive link farm suggest an attempt to lure users to external malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9960

Heuristics 6

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://dafemum.ru/aws?utm_term=bayesian+data+analysis+amazon
    • https://xukexepizebeb.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134592509/tofefa.pdf
    • http://help-igcopyright.xyz/what_is_pre_scientific_managementdys40.pdf
    • https://vujemojijub.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/3/9/133997462/foxazetaxalugoxujewi.pdf
    • https://zuzolavilasobin.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134523903/751008.pdf
    • http://ing-jobs-opportunities.com/gakowugonisegidapajfvjo.pdf
    • https://rodedewosesuge.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/6/0/136010241/runejij.pdf
    • https://fakedowekiz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135314463/zaxarezo.pdf
    • http://requiremcgood.com/204489136430a00g.pdf
    • http://wobijamitiz.iblogger.org/rainbow_shark_fish_tank_size.pdf
    • https://soxupewo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134392520/budoxip-gigakikeje-gomojaluteri.pdf
    • https://lesapexif.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131637780/sisikowebadafu.pdf
    • https://fomoxizukewoviw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739072/f7d8235df1a9b.pdf
    • https://nunezujotegu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134312528/18608.pdf
    • https://wilubiluzitewi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131413550/022fb7be5bbf68.pdf
    • https://vuguzunorofina.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134322364/35646.pdf
    • https://darugagoremu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134588092/1d04db9.pdf
    • https://zozetaxurumel.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134590082/kawadaminu_xasimulude.pdf
    • http://steelsho1.club/91540234775nw2kl.pdf
    • https://maparezoja.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135321508/lukobi.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://pidivatepijalaw.epizy.com/binix.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/af6ca03d-71b0-45fb-bc56-167da8ea208c/kekalazuruturejepuj.pdf
    • http://vabizofolimise.epizy.com/dd_cleric_spells_3.5.pdf
    • http://besarod.rf.gd/life_of_pi_plot_summary_brainly.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/11be549c-88b2-424b-8666-d379c81563dd/waduloxu.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/694d7e55-51ba-48e8-a659-61a78bdb0fc5/what_is_cloud_platform_as_a_service.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/f4cb870d-83a2-4027-a3d3-bd8ef56c57d7/ninja_blender_cups_bl610.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ee38.bin
bbc2f54e5718e12996ec6e065bc22e5ed673fade90e75720ba5062b6e56f970c
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEE38 5076 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000ff7d.bin
53f1b0c6b7dc1b5345102ebac25a2152322231208324cc4aae429f09ea1431bd
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFF7D 10920 bytes