Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e9f1e20a77795df3…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.3 KB
MD5: 847ef3a667dbc6fd18868ae73b1450af SHA-1: 6443ec3962134252064f086027bb2c024c53d6cf SHA-256: e9f1e20a77795df30b06b68afb6a5ef5d5ad781fe37dc3204cdf21f0eade06d4
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering critical heuristics related to Equation Editor exploitation. The presence of \objupdate indicates an attempt to force OLE object activation, which is a common technique for exploiting vulnerabilities like the Equation Editor flaw. This suggests the document is designed to deliver a payload via code execution when opened.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000b7.bin
406d74b6df056254cf7fc7d1afcfa9bbc2678aae56b026793c005f35d523d798
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xB7 1924 bytes