Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e9e04bace03e911f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

79.4 KB Created: 2021-06-11 17:16:17 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 7eefdb8f102ea302269e9bb749b9ed3c SHA-1: d6ee8144e4455dcc12584eab950e909ea5e3562a SHA-256: e9e04bace03e911f9c4b76913e2c5c53c3aefac10aa1cf0908e8dbd2a16d54fd
194 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file was detected as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier, indicating a high likelihood of malicious intent. It contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting a link farm designed to redirect users to potentially harmful content or phishing sites. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains references to 'Adobe after effect full crack 64bit', reinforcing the lure of pirated software to entice users to click on the embedded links.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 7

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://huntic.ru/pbw?utm_term=adobe+after+effect+full+crack+64bit
    • https://xexewevifiwewol.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/6/0/136054804/c2bd7a8527f4ef.pdf
    • https://dapifakefigev.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131636612/d2e21.pdf
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4414335/normal_5ffb30d1bb740.pdf
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4366628/normal_5fce003060658.pdf
    • https://vewiwuxipax.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681682/navovezeko.pdf
    • https://pexulowiseguwuz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134391342/sidamexajavob_womewitaxikowip_budapaxakujudo_gerubulam.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4371020/normal_6056e34077885.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4387816/normal_60235849a4a5a.pdf
    • https://bugajikiwolano.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134471946/1892513.pdf
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4470703/normal_5ff5034bb86ea.pdf
    • https://rejifiri.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380436/3133561.pdf
    • https://valezofijamope.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134445284/9966424.pdf
    • https://gupuletafajural.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776102/wadil-dugalo-kubojozenopip-nekeketakop.pdf
    • https://basuxujazako.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134467371/kupaboratub_depitupadamu.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4385848/normal_60666b041093b.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4403687/normal_6055edbbe3761.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/
    • http://penezilo.pbworks.com/f/construction_project_scheduling_and_control_saleh_mubarak_download.pdf
    • http://zatesil.pbworks.com/f/cowboy_bebop_episode_1_soundtrack.pdf
    • http://ruwomodanom.pbworks.com/f/68890073835.pdf
    • http://pigedigasexu.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/145093830/turewubikimobazanepotegi.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000eac5.bin
a5dccc9bffaa0f0a23f6cdc0d9e6922967445a825f1796baa087ca5af6178da1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEAC5 5048 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000fc0c.bin
e341a29d694a57b94fb89038e3fd00c35df74a67c36c474024535e801e859a9f
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFC0C 11140 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0001221d.bin
1158d95dac44631f497756703988ba3645251422e7ff0015d3fca430225e7c3e
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1221D 4324 bytes