Powload — Office (OLE) / .DOC malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e9cc355b9b2c501a…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

157.6 KB Created: 2019-05-02 11:37:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: 7d4a4641c60d7f701a3dbca02a3da145 SHA-1: fa917d4c8c6dee2797b95f13e328b922a83aca32 SHA-256: e9cc355b9b2c501a852825e354361d39910f68c1be617cd4370d32f2f9d65ebd
260 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Powload · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1218.011 System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32 T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample contains a VBA macro with an AutoOpen function, which is a common technique for initial execution. The macro utilizes GetObject and WMI (Win32_Process.Create) to launch a process, indicating a downloader or dropper functionality. ClamAV detection confirms this as 'Doc.Downloader.Powload-6960273-0', strongly suggesting the Powload family. The embedded URL, though benign, was likely a placeholder or part of a more complex delivery chain not fully represented here.

Heuristics 7

  • VBA WMI Win32_Process launcher critical OLE_VBA_WMI_PROCESS_CREATE
    VBA macro builds or references a WMI moniker for Win32_Process and invokes .Create to start a command. This is a high-confidence macro execution chain that often hides the WMI class name through string concatenation or helper functions.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Powload-6960273-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Powload-6960273-0
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
68fd3d242b9a28efd2dbb2e4b7fef683d67e5e73fbb585bc94047626e4871cb0		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 32160 bytes

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