Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e9ac6eecb94c4531…

MALICIOUS

PDF

73.7 KB Created: 2020-11-16 21:41:55 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-05
MD5: 47f12f741c60fa56085970047ceffbdd SHA-1: b6087554e72bcdad7d2f0863e43321ae8f192bf0 SHA-256: e9ac6eecb94c45310d56f225c12b4fd2d60171ab7e2bf8b17cfe09aff00f4483
254 Risk Score
Tags
free-cdn-ebook-manual-lure

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file was detected as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier, and it contains links to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The heuristic 'PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM' indicates a large number of external PDF links, suggesting an attempt to distribute or host malicious content. The 'SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE' heuristic suggests the document may be part of a multi-stage attack involving password-protected archives.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/strik?utm_term=obter+caderneta+registo+predial+de+a In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4380525/normal_5f9f7311867f7.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4411709/normal_5f95932e60516.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xujebope.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134018561/matojerasuw-talefukevozakab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://moxitasa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131454719/jorapimara-bekule.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://narogigadi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874066/bavijumiteri_tusuwibapides_rakewej_widititukog.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/pilazi/android_cisco_vpn_client_import_pcf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/leguvefu/63471587298.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/runuzitexokol/bunudanukasabitit.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zidenigad/45619187896.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/2fee97c1-f4cf-4bab-af0c-9c92a4c48d12/64646917745.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/xefejevife/reganajavut.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/tokatefozude/wetexanokorujafazizedugaj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/575b9e12-5214-4a38-9d2b-f03df3e1cb28/77859915550.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/wuzalugiseto/bolomeso.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d524.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD524 5408 bytes
SHA-256: bc727b317cf3f94186219fe7692fa19e32a9968e68e902691fab75a6fc15bcec
font_01_sfnt_off0000e782.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE782 1800 bytes
SHA-256: daad3f347a4f42f432ee9983e619a7c063e36761dba5934b469418034847e28e
font_02_sfnt_off0000f010.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF010 12992 bytes
SHA-256: cf97118498111916c64ce9c1e47e63699847c5d1c115caa511f2c1b3a70ae1ad

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