Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e96e066197c5b3fd…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

17.8 KB Created: 2022-06-24 20:16:00 UTC Authoring application: LibreOffice/7.3.3.2$Linux_X86_64 LibreOffice_project/30$Build-2 15.0000
MD5: d16427f5cff23f456934e7aecaba226c SHA-1: 3938dd5317ff3f2fa4baa06f39c2b240e2a896e9 SHA-256: e96e066197c5b3fd38e7a12318a232de2c8a703a0f419e0b7e30087f7525e530
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious Link/Object T1059.001 PowerShell

The document exploits CVE-2022-30190 (Follina) via an external OLE object. The lure text discusses a Cisco Spark Beta Program, encouraging users to click the embedded object. This action likely leads to the download and execution of a second-stage payload from the URL https://consumerfinanceguide.com/blog/index/blog.html!.

Heuristics 5

  • CVE-2022-30190 — Follina stage-1 external HTML oleObject critical CVE likely CVE_2022_30190
    External OLEObject relationship targets a remote .html with the Follina delivery shape (oleObject -> HTTP(S) HTML with trailing Moniker '!'). In live Follina samples the ms-msdt: trigger is served by the remote HTML, not the document itself.
  • ClamAV: Win.Exploit.CVE_2022_30190-9951234-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Exploit.CVE_2022_30190-9951234-1
  • External OLE object relationship high OOXML_EXTERNAL_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an oleObject relationship whose target is an external HTTP(S) URL. Office resolves this through OLE/object update paths rather than as a normal user-clicked hyperlink.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
887c1b2d3dfbb943e7a3ded9508b3fe48b08c5d3d946a5cc535dd8093e2de849		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.xlsx 4350 bytes
emf_00.emf
728547181e1398f63cc712c4834a65d1c7cdf7b360b66ecab509021e5a64440e		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 536 bytes

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