Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e9399093f7b77a91…

MALICIOUS

PDF

74.7 KB Created: 2020-11-16 23:44:25 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-26
MD5: b139d4b8b0281b1d59e7a8df1643692f SHA-1: 170d8c5ddda8311cf1eef8758404fce6c9566a94 SHA-256: e9399093f7b77a917094507ba71dbf79a6781d6fa26863120764a90ca5cc0a20
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, indicating a link farm designed to redirect users. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent, likely for phishing or malware distribution. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and numerous external links are indicative of techniques used to lure users to malicious sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffset.ru/strik?utm_term=red+hat+certified+specialist+in+secu PDF link annotation
    • https://kusanogiwaxug.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130873987/xokori.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gasuzenop.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134266144/1aa84d6b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tubenuluni.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437864/17a9a6.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4485448/normal_5fa8ddcd4b025.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4386089/normal_5fa3835dd154d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nezumise.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134265586/nowezesakitib.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4393502/normal_5f9bd2f53646b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4403120/normal_5f9852fd01fbb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kozezivu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134444222/ridumix-muverifux-witopo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/nabifovu/sigma_bc_509_manual.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/fe914f58-e60e-4186-ab80-bed6aa0f3300/lumijiwalidenodu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000db8f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDB8F 5020 bytes
SHA-256: aeaa86b09a06242f48495123c03f993789291ec03d99c5fe2a78751d8251329e
font_01_sfnt_off0000ec9b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEC9B 10380 bytes
SHA-256: 17f416adff636ceab044d10654c1a9ce28c97235044a20de7f05fff0a86c884c
font_02_sfnt_off00010f98.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10F98 4324 bytes
SHA-256: a542ec26cea93e049a2e27cd59b1347dd9bbdea13775fd7b822b3c2b3136116f

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