Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e938e82fd4b8a09a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

112.3 KB Created: 2021-08-17 20:32:50 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-27
MD5: d6724d26b4d98ab8d793d371205916ad SHA-1: 1b9e8dff46316b8308d19740e54ceb6502f35a3b SHA-256: e938e82fd4b8a09a776e176ff208a774aae52b8b852d879ecdee6d03030e733a
236 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The critical heuristic 'SE_SECRET_RECOVERY_LURE' indicates the document's primary purpose is to trick users into revealing sensitive recovery information. The presence of numerous external URLs, many pointing to compromised WordPress upload directories, suggests a phishing campaign designed to harvest credentials or other sensitive data. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF format and the nature of the heuristics suggest potential for embedded JavaScript or other exploit mechanisms.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9986

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Recovery secret / private key request critical SE_SECRET_RECOVERY_LURE
    Document requests recovery phrases, private keys, backup codes, or saved passwords. Requests for these secrets in a document are high-risk.
  • Clickable URI points to raw IP address medium PDF_URI_IP_LITERAL
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) action whose host is a literal IPv4 address. Legitimate documents normally link to named domains; raw-IP destinations are common in disposable phishing and malware-delivery infrastructure.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://krisoc.ru/uplcv?utm_term=qradar+siem+user+guide PDF link annotation
    • http://www.stockholmswingallstars.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608601a020cb3---34287223046.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.appsolutely.sg/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16085d66ab9d95---wogox.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sailstudy.in/ckfinder/userfiles/files/peloxa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://leavereview.com/customerinterview/ckfinder/userfiles/files/vadukowofa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sportsclinicwest.ie/media/contents/file/31976855266.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.zulfugar.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b5e62a8b289---79152539634.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://oreade-breche.fr/userfiles/file/kugoberurinava.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.burit.net/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160cc5e3fe639f---jolavorure.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://arerp.kr/data/file///vevivexonerodej.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://aduanaldelvalle.com/userfiles/file/suwarovutegaxu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://equalitas.es/userfiles/file/zupedonilesosafuvizi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tulga.ru/editor/files/kapemobe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://happinessgown.com/upload/users/files/tanesajerurajoriba.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.look4job.gr/images/_user_na/file/57770301308.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://157.230.241.115/image/upload/File/liwodino.pdfPDF link annotation
    • http://haniltm.kr/upfiles/editor/files/23204175579.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lisahyatthealth.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16096c8eabf1a1---rubabetisigasutisagafur.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nguyenthaotech.com/upload/files/mogawomej.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ubest.ru/images/file/75915954933.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pfgmm.com.au/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c465de93a7f---xawowitemuxe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://grodgolf.com/clients/f/fd/fd83fa7079552abb47853a85229f74c1/File/21789679271.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.sir.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160d269f9c9f27---78335085541.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000156bb.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x156BB 16976 bytes
SHA-256: 0de3c3733a5f65feab485d95444c05d729d0279582d22823be58481b6be04e09
font_01_sfnt_off00018340.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x18340 10384 bytes
SHA-256: 9b3045e89156904fe8465ac712ad1bc0de5880d4d3f33760e4fd6e85c1f883ea
font_02_sfnt_off00019a95.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x19A95 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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