Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e9258541a5c96fca…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

2.26 MB Created: 2022-08-11 14:50:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2022-08-11
MD5: 3b6a5f7e4f048cb005496243fe2a019e SHA-1: a2f68a276e0b18cb1f11745d9046f4ffa1b1a428 SHA-256: e9258541a5c96fcacb6a2ce349282db7e9403a16fa9f952e8f1f69929dda7abc
362 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File T1059.005 PowerShell T1059.001 PowerShell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information

The OOXML document contains a VBA project with a Document_Open macro, which is designed to execute automatically when the document is opened. The macro uses obfuscated function names and appears to load shellcode from document properties, a technique often used by downloaders to fetch and execute a second-stage payload. The document also explicitly instructs the user to enable editing and content, a common lure for macro-based malware.

Heuristics 10

  • VBA property-stored shellcode loader critical OLE_VBA_PROPERTY_SHELLCODE_LOADER
    VBA auto-exec macro takes the address (VarPtr) of a byte buffer decoded from a document property, marks memory executable (VirtualProtect/VirtualAlloc), and transfers control through a callback API (e.g. SetTimer/EnumWindows). The payload is hidden in the document properties rather than the macro source — the SVCReady loader pattern, a native shellcode runner rather than a parser CVE.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.9b8dac787078270f-OOXML-9981540-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.9b8dac787078270f-OOXML-9981540-0
  • VBA project part renamed to evade filename detection high OOXML_VBA_PROJECT_RENAMED
    The VBA project is bound through the OOXML relationship/content type but its part is not named vbaProject.bin. Legitimate Office producers always emit vbaProject.bin; renaming it hides the macros from path-only scanners (observed in the SVCReady loader).
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • CallByName call high OLE_VBA_CALLBYNAME
    CallByName call
  • VBA reads reversed config from document properties high OLE_VBA_REVERSED_DOCPROP_CONFIG
    VBA applies StrReverse to values read from the document's custom/built-in properties. Storing reversed configuration (URLs, CLSIDs, env-var names, payload names) in document properties keeps indicators out of the macro source — an obfuscation technique used by the SVCReady loader.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present (project part renamed away from vbaProject.bin: word/NIVzNXpIrE.bin)
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
0e020444e73efe4cfa8fdccd7c2071fc95b2650e26344dfdcb9eb7955a3db42b		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 20216 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
962afdab0ff92b5fe83d9d0cb3c3713816b71a8f8aa106366ef0124c4c4752e5		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/NIVzNXpIrE.bin 14848 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.