Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e9228a345f2d9e7f…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

1.16 MB
MD5: 7d4d448a7d403b6d949868b89edc010d SHA-1: 99c431853b504296c448035ba44d38426572063a SHA-256: e9228a345f2d9e7f0fcb8fe091c41e678f743295d723f6141769af47d4d8e082
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The OOXML file is encrypted with a default password and contains embedded OLE objects, specifically identified as an Equation Editor. This is a high-confidence indicator of an exploit carrier, likely designed to deliver a second-stage payload when opened. The presence of an Equation Editor OLE object is a strong indicator of an exploit attempt.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Equation Editor object carries payload-like Ole10Native stream high OLE_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE_PAYLOAD_ANOMALY
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object declares the Equation Editor CLSID but stores a large high-entropy Ole10Native stream with malformed package sizing. This is exploit-shaped Equation/OLE payload evidence.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.