Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e919a8babcb34423…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.06 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 0fb6693d0007cfa35a4296605efbd332 SHA-1: 7db40c7b563be9a4bf3682d541e3378834f856ce SHA-256: e919a8babcb344236f67e67531e60aaf0e73d4fc80b20801a6fbb69d14c53392
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The critical heuristic firings for RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and CVE_2017_8759 strongly indicate exploitation of the Equation Editor vulnerability. The RTF_OBJDATA and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics further support the presence of embedded OLE objects designed for activation. While no scripts were extracted, the file's structure and heuristic firings point to a classic exploit delivery mechanism.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00108199.bin
a93a62e2558265a6f0298118e3727b42198824a2e68da4679c728f533d5e99ff
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x108199 3739 bytes