Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e90df26cdd00b883…

MALICIOUS

PDF

88.0 KB Created: 2021-07-29 20:23:50 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 1d9768c5fbffcbb553d770b2defe2791 SHA-1: 82cc442b74033be38e6d576c0024a68611c73042 SHA-256: e90df26cdd00b8835b858d076c50a356bd4daef30ea3d79dffbdaf8f6193e7c9
216 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains multiple links to external PDFs hosted on compromised websites, suggesting a link farm used for distributing malicious content. The presence of a 'Password-protected archive handoff' heuristic indicates a common tactic to bypass security scanners. ClamAV detection and ML classification further confirm its malicious nature, likely as a phishing or trojan delivery mechanism.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9994

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE
    Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://www.pfgpartners.com.au/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b7419db0143---vafinopoxunariv.pdf
    • http://modelkyujin.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160716dca32e3d---35218292616.pdf
    • http://beckydavidsonhomes.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607d6df1d5daf---vigopitew.pdf
    • https://lengthening-sldf.com/userfiles/file/bodimifititezipujavetozez.pdf
    • https://avantkart.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/99n0b5vghhee3949anouggvhro/naravederupusefivoba.pdf
    • http://www.medical-psychology.gr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b2ae770e57c---63917067697.pdf
    • http://mouaumfb.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16076cc3b7e7dd---xozalijidogonotekakunux.pdf
    • http://www.akutrans.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b2449641862---13163091065.pdf
    • http://www.primalegal.eu/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/jv1jg93uarhmn9selu5nq0d421/manife.pdf
    • http://99hospitalitygroup.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/50671331968.pdf
    • https://bentzendesign.se/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b6aa16bde4a---tunejukoraberenalonopot.pdf
    • http://qunjl.com/userfiles/files/64278515898.pdf
    • http://www.hydro-tg.pro/upload/file/30764537938.pdf
    • https://capital-tic.com/upload/ckfinder_temp/files/20210528000652.pdf
    • https://medok18.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/a2211a8447f4d5846176e741a28057d8/dufomonugoledufe.pdf
    • https://www.mobytec.com.br/mobytec/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161029be4686c3---tejagim.pdf
    • http://pizzeria-millemiglia.de/app/webroot/img/editor/file/99153005169.pdf
    • https://jokerprod.net/userfiles/file/litadolezuxubididefetoso.pdf
    • https://maxflowfans.com/userfiles/file/93152376864.pdf
    • http://www.platformliften.info/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160aa157f41800---rebefefikumojej.pdf
    • https://sevsport.info/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/fbe03dabf62ef1a342c58b3dd691083e/6581833226.pdf
    • https://greshamgilessalon.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/d309760db94747584707c15afadfcdbe/58251129789.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/1KS0DP0cxss/uplcv?utm_term=how+to+reset+your+voicemail+password
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f33a.bin
dff86196cb1c1630fad9fdb6cf2bd4e8e4cdbcefcb31589a3e3d5e4a4c638ff3
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF33A 10928 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00010cab.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10CAB 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off000124bd.bin
35dd1a13e393458e2c2a3900b8aac0d0c0884c96588ca301264ac443528df754
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x124BD 17280 bytes