Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e8ffb0638380bed4…

MALICIOUS

PDF

37.1 KB Created: 2020-06-15 10:43:09 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: f59d6cc758dc3f52e89515eda3c82cea SHA-1: 3ec5424104bf2dd4a042c4a6cdef6dd4d72fbacf SHA-256: e8ffb0638380bed4ba5f058d7380a91557f6804637951b7bcf3f6dd28a1cebc8
94 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF document contains a significant number of external links, forming a link farm hosted on multiple subdomains. The ML classifier strongly indicated maliciousness. The primary attack pattern involves redirecting users to a large collection of SEO-optimized PDF files, likely to distribute further malware or engage in phishing. No scripts were extracted, limiting the analysis of direct payload execution.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 4

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://duboyouxixiazai.br3h.com/uploads/1/3/0/4/130476784/130476784.html#dc+neighborhood+guide
    • http://heritageparkysa.com/uploads/1/3/0/5/130550777/xisamo-sisesarox-dazupukobo-gadazita.pdf
    • http://cpanel.workinnvision.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775172/junajipanop_tatenofenuxixe.pdf
    • http://mail.bepdesign.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775545/mezis.pdf
    • http://hollywoodinteractive.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606055/busededad.pdf
    • http://carreraandrea.com/uploads/1/3/0/2/130274282/votomabitawuke_kovalesopanu_zewatabuwarula.pdf
    • http://mail.sharjonadventures.com/uploads/1/3/0/5/130551944/4952a4ea5673.pdf
    • http://erniebauer.com/uploads/1/3/0/3/130323932/868217.pdf
    • https://merefipo.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/19729311819.pdf
    • https://lagasig.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/79955582843.pdf
    • https://xewefevoba.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/vibel.pdf
    • https://voxidotusad.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/momorelofavexowupulux.pdf
    • https://jozimuril.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/72644433839.pdf
    • https://gadaxug.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/xebatejekatodawarusi.pdf
    • https://difovasiven.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/62549614804.pdf
    • https://jowixen.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/63653972535.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000063c7.bin
0dcf7dfaf9e788df8d2de266b9f0859bb9a385e8dc810a1797cb82e6b15aee8e		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x63C7 10992 bytes

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