Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e8e1af3431f3c683…

MALICIOUS

PDF

411.0 KB Created: 2020-02-10 10:29:01 +01:00 Authoring application: Microsoft® Word 2013 First seen: 2026-05-13
MD5: a0dde5b89b3ac08a01555794d5b04ad5 SHA-1: a2033af1079eb4deaeffdf5dd7bc86cffb1cb98b SHA-256: e8e1af3431f3c68376cbd507bf8b4f7a5c0d88ce9ba92408e8fffba8f68cacc2
82 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The critical ClamAV heuristic identified the file as Pdf.Dropper.Agent-7598146-0, indicating it's a known malicious PDF dropper. A medium heuristic also flagged a URL shortener, specifically http://bit.ly/2U8l7UH, which is a common technique to obscure malicious destinations. While the document body contains heavily obfuscated text, the presence of a URL shortener and the ClamAV detection strongly suggest the intent is to lure the user to a malicious site, likely for further exploitation or credential theft.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier suspicious score 0.2803

Heuristics 3

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Dropper.Agent-7598146-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Dropper.Agent-7598146-0
  • Clickable URI uses URL shortener medium PDF_URL_SHORTENER_URI
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) action whose destination is a URL shortener. This hides the final landing page from static review and is common in phishing redirect PDFs.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://bit.ly/2U8l7UH In PDF document text
    • https://docs.microsoft.com/typography/abouthttp://lucasfonts.comMicrosoftIn PDF document text
    • http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIT_LicenseIn PDF document text
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicrosoftTimeStampPCA.crl0XIn PDF document text
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicrosoftTimeStampPCA.crt0In PDF document text
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/MicCodSigPCA2011_2011-07-08.crl0aIn PDF document text
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/certs/MicCodSigPCA2011_2011-07-08.crt0In PDF document text
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/microsoftrootcert.crl0TIn PDF document text
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicrosoftRootCert.crt0In PDF document text
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicRooCerAut2011_2011_03_22.crl0^In PDF document text
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicRooCerAut2011_2011_03_22.crt0��In PDF document text
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/docs/primarycps.htm0@In PDF document text
    • http://www.microsoft.com/TypographyIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
stream_002_off0000918e.bin decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x918E 575228 bytes
SHA-256: 1fef1c5a7d721743c22d1878f3dfc6794e276aef1a534c0413822a64ba8ce4f0
stream_003_off000393df.bin decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x393DF 548888 bytes
SHA-256: 46c61b44e7e1961007b9cd331b8049c440df6a4c32f77257b3cd39f0cadfdaae