Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e89230b539f0abc7…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

38.3 KB First seen: 2023-05-24
MD5: d18076e077d2eb3f53d51e5bf80f2b3d SHA-1: 77f4fe5410a9d35381fa1dd16f4391cf71f92a02 SHA-256: e89230b539f0abc7abc4ed0c42420b603df58f1300f68fb219e3b33cbaae961a
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with an Equation Editor ProgID, triggered by \objupdate, indicating an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability. The document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing' to view the content, a common tactic for macro-based malware droppers.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000558a.bin
7ea8904ab0847ce3a80077c04c7333896c264a03be219f9994f050e5ab9d2c4a
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x558A 1577 bytes