Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e86fd22c592165db…

MALICIOUS

PDF

65.6 KB
MD5: 0dfefff630bff0bc42f5cd692dbe7514 SHA-1: c7f29c169e63c8027904b994fd11cd8c3f9d4e00 SHA-256: e86fd22c592165db550abf693b6eca2f5bc9322d212f49ace15d93f0c82e2399
136 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains an embedded XFA form that triggers the CVE-2010-0188 exploit, targeting a vulnerability in Adobe Reader's LibTIFF processing. This exploit allows for arbitrary code execution upon opening the document. No scripts were directly extracted, but the exploit itself is the primary mechanism for malicious execution.

Heuristics 6

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • XFA form contains executable script high CVE related PDF_XFA_SCRIPT
    PDF embeds an XFA form whose dataset contains a <script> or <xfa:script> block — XFA scripting has been the exploit primitive for several Adobe Reader RCEs (CVE-2010-0188 family, CVE-2018-4901, and others). Plain XFA without scripts is far less risky.
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0008.bin
c5aca31614e780ac33b647b3311bdea7f9b58cee007d6e36b3621dcd03fa5af4
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0xC6 66424 bytes