RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · e86affe17004b9e6

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

435.1 KB

MD5: 3e1816aaa393b5390f39b107a6d3b96d SHA-1: 6000cb396cd1a62f28ec7545ac9d05ee3117b9eb SHA-256: e86affe17004b9e6f5eec414528a0029ca56da53981a13763c3c7ad8161df5f9

182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a ProgID indicative of Equation Editor, specifically triggering heuristics related to CVE-2017-11882. The presence of \objupdate further suggests that the OLE object is designed to be activated automatically. This points to an exploit delivery mechanism targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability to execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 5

Equation Editor OLE1 native payload — CVE-2017-11882 related critical CVE related CVE_2017_11882_RELATED

RTF decodes to an OLE1 Equation.3 embedded object whose native data is large and payload-like, and \objupdate requests automatic activation. This is the delivery shape used by Equation Editor RCE documents such as CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802, but the malformed MTEF record needed for exact attribution was not recovered.
Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off000000d3.bin` `bdb524846194edf2dc117dc83507dd89a713f5ea1f4b724fab8bccd8013c772f`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xD3	222474 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.

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