Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e8635425c2d1276d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

34.4 KB Created: 2020-08-03 12:42:07 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 8f9eb2dc01df5c457c24aa9a48bb2881 SHA-1: 0fa779f5edefcfdfefa1f6f873d37ab502a501d6 SHA-256: e8635425c2d1276dd50679efc009ba7e0663db4ca180e473061d364bb0b35ba9
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF contains a mass external link farm, with a primary link pointing to a known malicious redirector. The document body text, though heavily obfuscated, contains the same text as the malicious URL, suggesting a lure to download a fake PDF. The heuristic PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK confirms the presence of a link to malicious infrastructure.

Heuristics 3

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=acr+bi+rads+atlas+5th+edition+pdf
    • http://files.rccgwinnersassemblygp.org/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969176/369805.pdf
    • http://files.scratchbuiltstudios.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814935/xepevurado-dalexenoripin.pdf
    • http://files.livingwellstudios.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856288/tiruxukuxudesul.pdf
    • http://files.aspaceoddity.co.uk/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776374/vifer.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/2940/5600/files/90002506806.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0439/4264/1832/files/vopazubifovexef.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/3303/3877/files/50181986611.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/5511/9513/files/hp_officejet_j4680_manual.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/0349/5071/files/56663554960.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/6570/4599/files/sifejuwiluxexisotej.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/1977/9742/files/sidusufaxilafobirofesiv.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/1688/7192/files/86375432287.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/3723/6119/files/xevikatisiviveme.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/9299/2410/files/31683355415.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/3350/8512/files/fifukapabamopojunowit.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00004929.bin
a7e0d35d988faa741d9db0395627f994f3978a1a9e17a36f7f43482a4158977b
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4929 5496 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00005bd5.bin
e34f408e2b4d16776ded23bfea868221329879ea4e8961b7d8714a65b420223e
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5BD5 9672 bytes