Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e853ef45a3cb59f4…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

227.2 KB
MD5: 203e0f6e92d3d37b5fdf9deb39146951 SHA-1: 9123655b5e599b89ae522f3f9a6d568dc41cabf0 SHA-256: e853ef45a3cb59f46eb5d7f6403ee413ef5dfdcdac9f79f4a02eb04ab4c5bcdf
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, including an automatically linked object that is forced to update. This technique is commonly used to lure users into enabling content, which then executes embedded malicious code. The presence of `RTF_OBJDATA`, `RTF_OBJEMB`, `RTF_OBJAUTLINK`, and `RTF_OBJUPDATE` heuristics strongly indicates an attempt to exploit OLE object activation for payload delivery. The `SE_ENABLE_LURE` heuristic further confirms the document's intent to trick the user into enabling malicious content.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000965.bin
7a15923fc14bde903ab0db7f87afa71dcd8a4d3bab816c8facd0579ccebd7a69		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x965 19621 bytes
objdata_01_off0000a972.bin
18cff8ef194415d33763880bf64011d23305e4b9143b76244b89e1c53b70a0d5		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xA972 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off0000bf15.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBF15 12297 bytes

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