Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e8475fe3ac277d2e…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

61.1 KB Created: 2023-03-12 09:53:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2023-03-16
MD5: e0cf0881de0fe35732bb02c1f4df02a3 SHA-1: 3978abfd510cafbda865b708d6896560fede9a32 SHA-256: e8475fe3ac277d2eda466aaa4d42044d7230ac650b62dde38bf9727514c3ad69
242 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1204.002 Malicious File T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample is an OOXML document containing a VBA macro that executes upon opening. The AutoOpen macro uses WMI to launch a second-stage payload by downloading it from a Google Drive URL and saving it to a temporary file. The script then executes this downloaded payload using wscript.exe.

Heuristics 7

  • VBA WMI Win32_Process launcher critical OLE_VBA_WMI_PROCESS_CREATE
    VBA macro builds or references a WMI moniker for Win32_Process and invokes .Create to start a command. This is a high-confidence macro execution chain that often hides the WMI class name through string concatenation or helper functions.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape
    • https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=1SoDzDxjeD9T-yPcpXXI1hWkYpwGq7-00&confirm=t

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7a9cecbbcd00468ac18a2c6a047b3f956f4a82261b023412140a28198c8cab8a
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1602 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
b722e70e27337302c6c326c0f4385601643d1c286579e119e75f7f6a97a3e046
vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 12288 bytes