Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e8453d2d424d5042…

MALICIOUS

PDF

36.8 KB Created: 2020-08-29 23:13:18 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 9c161cc3713aceca8d886ff5731f3c26 SHA-1: 08da39e94762b0bee2f32949b3c19ddf1d89212f SHA-256: e8453d2d424d5042f7857bbcec36fad565c8852a779e8ee6be60a703003ea9e7
150 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF file contains a link to a redirector URL, which is a common tactic for delivering malicious payloads or phishing pages. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains text related to a lost Logitech mouse receiver and the malicious URL, suggesting a lure to trick users into clicking the link. The PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK heuristic firing confirms the presence of a link to known malicious infrastructure.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 3

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/wix?keyword=logitech+m215+nano+receiver+lost+soc
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/e8506d_dc3e0029d55f455b800ac595b65aedde.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_557249ec494e4881a9f2d85c22145eb4.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/1e32c2_0a5f5aadf67441f3a3536b8ec980535b.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_b0c8a07c63bc4490848aecc2d8d2a1b7.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_f8d12838077847a99950e74cb370d10e.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/1415/1589/files/cpm_homework_answers_chapter_7.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/9812/0094/files/wenokusulisajapigatupife.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/3913/7702/files/deadlock_report_sql_server_2012.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_c40a06dee65b4ebbbabd8150b28c8d04.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_aa86e560b5d84967a8f05fbf899b2897.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00004eb4.bin
5aa36babcc41d80cb4e5371065e4200a7a25df775c499a9f16b34bb8b5b0e12d
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4EB4 5524 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000616b.bin
4576de29b8c11d25526e00c9851b2acb3cbd570d1188f2b63d3737b8b8a43d3a
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x616B 10852 bytes