RTF malware analysis — malicious · e81c3fa3bd5abae7

MALICIOUS

RTF

34.6 KB First seen: 2023-07-04

MD5: 62b760433ef4ba2fc244274cb5e45d46 SHA-1: b2c272b2c2d11620d42fac4a0cd2f491e5891c8c SHA-256: e81c3fa3bd5abae78565f26b36234b2998dcfff97eff538bb53b2cdbb2455b0a

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 Malicious Link T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The RTF document contains OLE object data and specifically targets the Equation Editor, a known vulnerability vector. The presence of \objupdate and SE_ENABLE_LURE heuristics indicates the document attempts to trick the user into activating the embedded object, likely leading to the exploitation of the Equation Editor vulnerability. This suggests a downloader or exploit delivery mechanism.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off000044cd.bin` `ca4087536a1ec3693149649e38a91b2abc65d736c3619aa3a1dbab738dc48774`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x44CD	1868 bytes

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