PDF malware analysis — malicious · e8070bc040e6e1cf

MALICIOUS

PDF

77.6 KB Created: 2021-02-22 07:19:48 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-22

MD5: 6ca17b2f12ef85e33d3ecb57d20cd1fa SHA-1: 757d846119920af4ec91edbbd59619f56a82e89a SHA-256: e8070bc040e6e1cf1a1d52a49d432204054be03482134064667efab5656fe675

246 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting a link farm designed to redirect users to malicious content. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent. The presence of a password-protected archive lure heuristic suggests the document is intended to trick users into downloading an additional payload, likely after providing a password.

Machine Learning

Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 8

ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM

Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE

Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM

Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE

Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
External URI info PDF_URI

PDF contains an external URL action
Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL

The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL https://jacksth.ru/strik?utm_term=tp+link+ac2600+factory+reset PDF link annotation
- https://kagozekexep.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/9/135956698/2150217.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://cdn.sqhk.co/sileluzorupo/ckmicBk/85355046619.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://xijitivagafe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134709267/wakowa.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://zikagedatudupoz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134266226/zipuxejimof.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://motaxajofepox.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381237/6389609.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://gaturipagi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739573/d3cdbd7.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://ruxibotululag.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131408142/5885611.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://jewadasin.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134604584/9e923c8af6d.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://cdn.sqhk.co/vetelojid/fhwgjD7/18481262419.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://vufufibujirefe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134355905/60a3d9c66043c27.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://tuwavufubuxa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/3/9/133997694/8143536.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://misapunuzure.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606411/jopatotubo_jedajevu.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://cdn.sqhk.co/kizusuvut/IFuEgju/house_flipping_101_hgtv.pdfIn PDF document text
- http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
- http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
- http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
- http://miduzusajaveg.rf.gd/79876802047.pdfIn PDF document text
- http://kipikavotofi.rf.gd/nozivizisubokutazekow.pdfIn PDF document text
- http://taravelimaliliz.rf.gd/ncert_political_science_book_class_9_in_hindi_download.pdfIn PDF document text
- http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
- http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`font_00_sfnt_off0000e58e.bin`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE58E	5340 bytes
SHA-256: `f8736cd0a9a6ba7970658b24b565b2fe9f5f0a9a9f22f8458f5d0d4514ef86ed`
`font_01_sfnt_off0000f7ba.bin`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF7BA	10304 bytes
SHA-256: `5e64788f432da51ce0b41febf7ef2f19fd423ec49ab4d1db0c39b580be32db6b`
`font_02_sfnt_off00011b0b.bin`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11B0B	4324 bytes
SHA-256: `1062cd8ddf90f4344fa193b395386d5669df1a952e5759311ca261a71931f361`

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