Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e7f1ccf01a3456e7…

MALICIOUS

PDF

82.3 KB Created: 2021-08-20 16:49:45 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-24
MD5: 75131e524c2f9a2ba24323c608dc0d6f SHA-1: ae0384859139d28fba9b6783aade52a21c9025c9 SHA-256: e7f1ccf01a3456e70b27f504d9840e6cb2d970be08bb9610be3f856ab7992bb5
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file exhibits multiple indicators of malicious intent, including repeated invisible links designed to deliver a payload and a link farm pointing to compromised CMS uploads. The heuristic 'SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE' suggests the document aims to trick users into downloading a password-protected archive, likely to bypass security filters. The ML classifier strongly flagged this PDF as malicious, and ClamAV detected it as a phishing trojan.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9987

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Invisible/repeated PDF links deliver payload file critical PDF_REPEATED_PAYLOAD_LINK_LURE
    PDF uses invisible link annotations and points to a direct payload download. Repeated invisible links or lure-like payload names such as document/unlock/verify archives match malware-delivery PDF carriers where the page is only a prompt and the real payload is fetched from the linked URL.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://perfectthesale.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160869dbad5618---bipivadozanegu.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://murtenhof.ch/userfiles/files/9789193010.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://gerd-pollak.de/userfiles/file/xarivanoka.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ventana-sur.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b9aae5e76f3.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://cesurmakina.com/userfiles/file/gunamevubuxik.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://yao-cheng.com/uploadfiles/20210702021552.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://binarbaidtrading.com/public_html/userfiles/file/20422083154.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://avis-medical.ma/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5c08246f7f791a8156dc1e1ca1582ed0/21858500231.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.wm-meyer.de/meyer/admin/editor/ckfinder/userfiles/files/99368035491.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://arte-salon.ru/upload_picture/79247928106.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://miamiuniquelimo.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608fa16cc0ce4---mobep.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.davidcosz.de/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/arq9pf60kdfs4olq6f588abgnh/63644199875.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nationalcardsolutions.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b6b534718a7---navifaxetikewukisadojele.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://balance-global.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ehndgamb36spq7fvc0f2ld5mai/fidoxirobemusufefidujewix.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://massvt.sk/editor_uploads/system/files/54654245016.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://crabandclaw.com/uploads/files/komaviworutelimeziwix.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xn--80afc2apd5n.xn--j1amh/upload/files/29706087205.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.golaw.net/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b70c56195b5---37757936505.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.baileysmilk.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/23bf9be2315bd23dc2cf6a8bd9836e84/87899704735.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.kiakaha.gr/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/505u8mmebvg50uacoq4mdqamgh/9049722471.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://x-site.by/upload/editor/files/dilesexizupapowi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://prairieroseclothiers.com/FCKeditor/file/romisaxuvavoxexufab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mrdak.cc/uploadfile/files/mejepavinulenenejowi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.rolstoellift.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607d0bb920343---lavurufekemoveluforubemuw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://project-lovcen.me/userfiles/file/pomurakeketokixotoxo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/FevRqgeaUVY/uplcv?utm_term=kaspersky+trial+reset+2020.rarIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000dc15.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDC15 18160 bytes
SHA-256: 8a8bf80b04f2dfcb10f941672fea00c1328ac4aafdd132a4b0ecce56d0144598
font_01_sfnt_off00010ab7.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10AB7 10528 bytes
SHA-256: 0b4664700894d8702c0f4e8e6c02ec9f2c82a4e0b813b39b5010cc5a560ab613
font_02_sfnt_off000122f0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x122F0 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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