Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e7c58ed765d28f23…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

8.1 KB First seen: 2022-06-09
MD5: 7496892813d41d318018723e7051d1c9 SHA-1: be716dd2f8faa5cdb66b56a782667259adcb33b3 SHA-256: e7c58ed765d28f237758960f655db1e588c91b25afd5d4bfd44eb610f2cd7aa6
139 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559.001 Component Object Model T1059.001 PowerShell

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, indicated by RTF_OBJDATA firings. High-confidence heuristics RTF_OBJAUTLINK and RTF_OBJUPDATE suggest that these objects are automatically linked and updated, which is a common technique for executing embedded malicious content upon document opening. The specific nature of the embedded object could not be fully determined due to truncation, but the OLE activation mechanism points to an attempt to run code.

Heuristics 3

  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000b26.bin
4202226f29756b5a8d131309f7ba93037bfb97104dcee2c655f249cd72f05fa3
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xB26 1614 bytes