Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e7a924b240ede2f6…

MALICIOUS

RTF

8.2 KB
MD5: 8a37d3eade38af278e75a490fcde593a SHA-1: 35443986944907bba3fcb2cdf05981579b0d6236 SHA-256: e7a924b240ede2f6ed451ab16690961d09ee9701cb2d0a588a437f061485ca8d
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object that exploits a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor. This technique is commonly used to download and execute a second-stage payload. The presence of RTF-specific heuristics like RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and RTF_OBJDATA strongly indicates this attack vector. No specific family could be identified, but the delivery mechanism is clear.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000c3d.bin
69956db9f9bf639bd66613c7c6f7c1ff2fa48fea6a678f19eeead39a666e9ceb		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xC3D 1896 bytes

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