Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e7a646aa466f39ca…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

56.1 KB Created: 2021-08-30 16:15:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 15.0000
MD5: af9a942d7277affd2774df7018ae1b60 SHA-1: 33d722998369f98fdd47e0c3da7ecb3718a2aaef SHA-256: e7a646aa466f39caae8b7f5270ec69655b02beda23da4eeb8bbf8ab34267bc23
102 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample contains an embedded OLE object, specifically identified as a Microsoft Equation Editor object. Heuristics indicate this object exploits CVE-2018-0798 due to an anomalous native stream. This vulnerability allows for the execution of arbitrary code, likely leading to a second-stage payload download or execution.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Embedded OLE object word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • CVE-2018-0798 — anomalous Equation Editor native stream high CVE likely CVE_2018_0798_EQUATION_NATIVE_ANOMALY
    Embedded Equation Editor OLE data contains anomalous native stream bytes consistent with a CVE-2018-0798-style Equation Editor exploit. This is treated as likely CVE evidence because the Equation object is malformed and payload-like, but it does not match the exact public matrix-overflow byte signature.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
56d3e5f9ecaacb68801968ccd802668436ef848de96be67618feb83fc5070c96
ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 4096 bytes
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
b51c3071718a34fa5af757c996e203935170ee812d496f3d32171bce26d3db11
ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: oLE10natiVe 1762 bytes