RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · e7a2907b9a46d7f9

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

375.3 KB

MD5: 9dad0474f308ae7a83d2194e9711bc08 SHA-1: 273449752e2516bd2f2be04796796203906d0fb7 SHA-256: e7a2907b9a46d7f99a07b833c31ec4d73011595298633ba685f42d53431356b6

180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains multiple OLE object-related heuristics, including automatic linking and updates, indicating an attempt to execute embedded content. The document body explicitly instructs the user to 'download the document and click Enable Editing', a clear lure to bypass macro security. No scripts were extracted, and the primary mechanism appears to be OLE object manipulation within the RTF structure.

Heuristics 6

Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED

RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 4 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000965.bin` `11d44c2f05eb7a3dabe1bdd227281d6c04b31fcb97efd71a2033d3ef1bac7253`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x965	79780 bytes
`objdata_01_off00007114.bin` `2b2a27d3e17641da77f1ad50fa196d53c7736be14737aa785176e31aab4a40fe`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x7114	79753 bytes
`objdata_02_off0002f9b3.bin` `a8e170497da15decc11753d202c99c86f7a7ffd2d52481e6b9c79a5403675379`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x2F9B3	2632 bytes
`objdata_03_off00030f56.bin` `e8d4fe950caed6dcfde26f4b616825bbe11b93458425974b7d075167f675abf7`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x30F56	12297 bytes

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